GR L 23056; (May, 1968) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-23056 May 27, 1968
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch V, SEBASTIAN L. ROSALES and CANUTO GERONIMO, respondents.
FACTS
A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to compel petitioner Manila Railroad Company (MRRCo.) to deliver to plaintiff Sebastian L. Rosales a lot of structural steel junks (250 metric tons) and three units of junk equipment (a Crane “General”, a Crane “Lorain”, and a Rock Crusher) upon payment of the balance of the purchase price. On March 18, 1964, respondent Judge Nicasio Yatco rendered a decision approving a compromise agreement between the parties. The agreement stipulated that MRRCo. would deliver the three junk equipment units within ten days. After that delivery, Rosales would pay P21,500.00 (50% of the price for the steel junks), and MRRCo. would deliver 125 metric tons of the structural steel junks. Rosales would then pay the balance of P21,500.00 within 60 days, after which MRRCo.’s obligation to deliver the second 125 metric tons would commence. The agreement also provided that in case of default by MRRCo., Rosales could, on ex-parte motion, ask for immediate execution.
Subsequently, Rosales filed ex-parte motions alleging MRRCo.’s refusal to deliver. Respondent judge issued orders on March 23 and March 31, 1964, appointing special sheriffs (including respondent Canuto Geronimo) and directing police assistance to take immediate possession of the equipment and the first 125 metric tons of steel. These orders authorized the use of force and the custody of persons obstructing the orders. As a result, Julian Salvador, an MRRCo. employee, was detained, and 125 metric tons of structural steel were taken from MRRCo.’s Caloocan compound. MRRCo. claimed this steel was brand-new and not the junk subject of the agreement.
On May 29, 1964, upon another ex-parte motion by Rosales, the judge issued an order for the special sheriff to take immediate possession of the second 125 metric tons of structural steel and directed specific MRRCo. officers to comply. MRRCo. filed an urgent motion on June 3, 1964, seeking to nullify the prior orders, a restraining order, return of the taken steel, and to desist from taking brand-new steel, alleging the orders were instruments of coercion and that persons were detained illegally. Without a hearing on this motion, respondent judge issued an order on June 5, 1964, denying the prayer for a restraining order and instructing the special sheriff to enforce the May 29 order strictly. MRRCo. then filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the orders of March 23, March 31, and May 29, 1964, which authorized immediate execution through special sheriffs and police assistance, including taking persons into custody, without a hearing and based solely on ex-parte motions, and in issuing the order of June 5, 1964, denying MRRCo.’s motion without a hearing.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition. The respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. The compromise judgment did not specifically authorize immediate execution; it only stated that in case of MRRCo.’s default, Rosales “may, on ex-parte motion, ask for immediate execution.” This clause merely gave Rosales the right to move for execution; it did not automatically grant execution or dispense with the need for the judge to determine the fact of default. Before issuing a writ of execution, the judge must ascertain whether there was indeed a breach. This requires a hearing, as the motion for execution based on alleged default is not a mere procedural formality but involves a question of fact. The judge erred in granting execution ex-parte without giving MRRCo. an opportunity to be heard on whether it had defaulted.
Furthermore, the orders directing special sheriffs and police to take persons into custody for obstruction, without any contempt proceedings, violated basic due process. A judge cannot order imprisonment for contempt without giving the person charged an opportunity to be heard. The use of police to enforce civil execution and detain individuals without a hearing was a clear abuse of judicial power.
The order of June 5, 1964, denying MRRCo.’s urgent motion without a hearing, also constituted grave abuse of discretion. The motion raised serious allegations about the execution being enforced against property not subject to the judgment (brand-new steel vs. junk) and illegal detentions. The judge was duty-bound to hear the motion to ascertain the facts.
The Supreme Court set aside the challenged orders and directed the respondent judge to conduct a proper hearing on MRRCo.’s urgent motion of June 3, 1964, and on any motion for execution by Rosales, to determine the facts of default and the identity of the property subject to execution. The preliminary injunction issued by the Court was ordered to remain in force. Costs were imposed on private respondent Rosales.
