G.R. No. L-23002 July 31, 1967
CONCEPCION FELIX VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ., ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez (appellant) contracted a second marriage with Domingo Rodriguez, who had four children from a prior marriage (appellees). Prior to this marriage, appellant owned two fishponds covered by OCTs. On January 24, 1934, appellant executed a deed of sale conveying these fishponds to her daughter, Concepcion Calderon, for P2,500. Three days later, Calderon transferred the properties to appellant and Domingo Rodriguez. The titles were subsequently issued in the names of the spouses. Domingo Rodriguez died in 1953. On March 16, 1953, appellant and the appellees (Rodriguez’s children and grandchildren) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of his estate, listing the fishponds as conjugal property and partitioning them, with appellant receiving half as her conjugal share and the appellees receiving the other half. Appellant later participated in subsequent transactions involving these properties, including a deed of partition (1954), a grant of usufruct to her (1954), and a lease contract (1961). After relations soured and a demand for unpaid earnings was made, appellant filed an action on May 28, 1962, seeking to declare null and void the 1934 deeds of transfer, alleging they were executed under duress and without consideration, and to recover the properties. She alternatively claimed a widow’s share if the properties were deemed conjugal.

ISSUE

1. Whether the 1934 deeds of transfer were executed under duress and are therefore voidable.
2. Whether the 1934 deeds are simulated, inexistent, and void for lack of consideration.
3. Whether appellant’s action is barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

RULING

1. On Duress: The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the evidence for duress was not convincing, relying on improbable and biased testimony contradicted by other witnesses. Furthermore, an action based on duress (a vice of consent) prescribes in four years after the duress ceases. The action was filed in 1962, 28 years after the alleged 1934 duress and 9 years after Domingo Rodriguez’s death, and was thus clearly barred. Appellant’s subsequent transactions confirming the transfers also negated this claim.
2. On Simulation and Lack of Consideration: The Court found the charge of simulation untenable. The evidence showed the parties intended to convert the property from paraphernal to conjugal to vest a half-interest in Rodriguez, evading the prohibition on donations between spouses under the Civil Code of 1889. Since both parties intended the conveyances to produce legal effects (to circumvent the law), the contracts were not simulated. However, the illicit purpose (evasion of Article 1334) rendered the consideration illicit. Applying Article 1306 of the Civil Code, where both parties are guilty of an illicit consideration that is not a crime, neither can recover what was given. Appellant, being equally guilty in the illicit scheme, could not recover the properties.
3. On Prescription, Laches, and Estoppel: The Court ruled that appellant’s action was barred. She had knowledge of the 1934 transactions as a party thereto. Her inaction for 28 years, including a 9-year period after her husband’s death when she could have acted without fear, was unjustified. Her subsequent participation in the extrajudicial settlement, partition, usufruct, and lease agreements, all premised on Rodriguez owning a share, constituted ratification and placed her in estoppel to question the transfers’ validity. Her demand had become stale.
The decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint was affirmed.