G.R. No. L-23; August 14, 1945
FILOMENA DOMIIT CABILING, petitioner, vs. THE PRISON OFFICER OF THE MILITARY PRISON OF QUEZON CITY, respondent.

FACTS

Lino Cabiling, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Scouts, United States Army, was charged with the premeditated killing of Sergeant Epifanio Roce by shooting him with a carbine on or about June 27, 1945. He was tried, found guilty by a General Court-Martial appointed by the Commanding General of the Philippine Base Section, United States Army, and sentenced to dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor for seven years. He is detained at the Philippine Detention and Rehabilitation Center, Apo 75. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on his behalf, alleging his detention is illegal because the General Court-Martial lacked jurisdiction to try and convict him for the crime charged. The petitioner contends that since the Philippines had been liberated and the Commonwealth Government reestablished, the civil courts, not the military court, should have jurisdiction over the common crime of murder.

ISSUE

Whether or not the General Court-Martial had jurisdiction to try and convict Lino Cabiling for the crime of murder, such that his detention is lawful and the writ of habeas corpus should not be granted.

RULING

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition. The General Court-Martial had jurisdiction to try and convict Lino Cabiling. Under Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person is detained by virtue of a judgment or order from a court that had jurisdiction. Applying the Articles of War: (1) Under Article 12, General Courts-Martial have power to try any person subject to military law for any offense punishable by the articles. (2) Under Article 2, the petitioner, as a staff sergeant of the Philippine Scouts, U.S. Army, is a person subject to military law. (3) Under Article 92, in time of war, the crime of murder committed by a person subject to military law falls within court-martial jurisdiction. The Court took judicial notice that the war against Japan was still ongoing at the time. Therefore, the court-martial acted within its jurisdiction, and the detention is lawful. The petition was dismissed without costs.
CONCURRING OPINIONS:
* Justice De Joya concurred, adding that courts-martial have jurisdiction over offenses against military law committed by individuals in the service. The judgment of a court-martial acting within its lawful powers cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus, except to inquire into the legality of its constitution and jurisdiction. Presumptions favor official action, and such judgments have the same finality as those of civil courts.
* Justice Perfecto concurred, stating that the main contention of the petitioner was without merit. He emphasized that no irregularity in the court-martial proceedings was alleged or shown, and no substantial injustice was claimed. Courts are instruments to serve justice, and there is no reason to disturb proceedings that have fulfilled that mission.