G.R. No. L-22810 August 31, 1967
FIREMEN’S INSURANCE COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANILA PORT SERVICE, MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, KLAVENESS LINE and/or SMITH, BELL & CO., (Phil.) INC., defendants. MANILA PORT SERVICE and MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

On February 24, 1962, James S. Baker and Company shipped 50 pails of grouting materials and 100 pails of concrete surface hardening compound on board the M/S “Bougainville” (owned by Klaveness Line, represented by Smith, Bell & Co.), consigned to E. J. Nell Co. of Manila. The vessel arrived in Manila on March 16, 1962, and the shipment was discharged complete and in good order into the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port Service (MPS). When the consignee took delivery through its broker, MPS delivered 13 pails of grouting material in a dented condition with loosened covers and damaged contents. MPS issued a bad order examination certificate noting “B. O. Pier,” indicating the damage occurred at the pier. The shipment was insured by Firemen’s Insurance Company, which paid the consignee P1,281.19 for the damage and was subrogated to the consignee’s rights. The insurer then filed a claim for P854.14 with the defendants, which was refused. The consignee filed a provisional claim with MPS on March 19, 1962, and formal claims with both the carrier’s agent and MPS on May 12, 1962. The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint against the carrier (Klaveness Line/Smith, Bell & Co.) but ordered MPS and Manila Railroad Company to pay the plaintiff P854.14, with interest, attorney’s fees, and costs. MPS and Manila Railroad Company appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether the plaintiff had a valid cause of action against the appellants, specifically regarding compliance with the claim-filing requirement under the Management Contract.

RULING

1. On Jurisdiction: The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction. The complaint joined, in the alternative, a cause of action against the carrier (for breach of contract of carriage, an admiralty matter within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance) and a cause of action against the arrastre operator (which, if standing alone due to the amount involved, would be within municipal court jurisdiction). Under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, such joinder of alternative causes of action is permitted. Since one cause of action was cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the suit was correctly filed there. The subsequent dismissal of the case against the carrier did not divest the Court of First Instance of the jurisdiction it had already acquired.
2. On the Cause of Action / Claim Filing: The plaintiff’s cause of action against the arrastre operator (appellants) was valid. Appellants argued that the formal claim filed on May 12, 1962, was beyond the 15-day period from the discharge of the last package (March 16, 1962) required under the Management Contract. The Court held that the provisional claim filed on March 19, 1962, within the 15-day period, satisfied the contractual requirement. A provisional claim is sufficient if it sets forth enough facts to give the arrastre operator a reasonable opportunity to investigate while facts are fresh and documents are available. The provisional claim here, which stated the shipment “cannot be found within the pier premises and/or were found (in) damaged condition” and requested checks and certificates, was adequate. Furthermore, the bad order examination certificate issued by MPS itself showed the damage occurred at the pier. The Court also noted that, based on precedent, the 15-day period for filing a claim should be reckoned from the date the consignee learns of the loss or damage, not strictly from the date of discharge. Since the date the consignee learned of the damage was not proven, appellants’ defense of late filing could not be sustained. The decision of the lower court was affirmed.