GR L 22793; (May, 1967) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-22793; May 16, 1967
Carmelita Tan and Rodolfo Tan, petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals and Francisco Tan (alias Tan Uh Bak and Tan Seng Ka), respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan, through their mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem, initially sued respondent Francisco Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 26909) for acknowledgment and support on July 22, 1955. After presenting evidence, Celestina Daldo moved to dismiss the case on March 26, 1956, on the ground of an amicable settlement, and prayed for dismissal with prejudice. On the same day, she executed an affidavit stating that Francisco Tan was not the father of the minors but “another person whose name I cannot divulge.” The court dismissed the case with prejudice. On November 25, 1957, petitioners, through their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem, filed a new action for acknowledgment and support involving the same parties and subject matter in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Civil Case 00855). The trial court initially dismissed the case on grounds of res judicata and insufficiency of evidence, but upon reconsideration, reversed itself and declared petitioners as illegitimate children of Francisco Tan, ordering support. Francisco Tan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s reconsidered decision and dismissed the complaint. Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court in forma pauperis.
ISSUE
1. Whether the testimonies of witnesses from the former trial (Exhibits H and I) are admissible in the present case under Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
2. Whether petitioners have sufficiently proved their illegitimate filiation to respondent Francisco Tan to entitle them to acknowledgment and support.
RULING
1. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the testimonies from the former trial (Exhibits H and I) were inadmissible. Section 41, Rule 130 allows testimony from a former trial only if the witness is deceased, out of the Philippines, or unable to testify. The witnesses in question were subpoenaed but did not appear; they were not dead, outside the Philippines, or “unable to testify” as construed by jurisprudence (e.g., due to grave cause almost amounting to death, such as loss of speech). Their refusal to testify did not constitute legal inability. Petitioners had remedies like seeking arrest or contempt charges but failed to avail them.
2. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ finding that petitioners failed to prove their case with clear, strong, and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals’ factual conclusions are binding in an appeal by certiorari. Key considerations included: (a) the inadmissibility of the former testimonies; (b) the baptismal certificates (Exhibits A and C) and birth certificate (Exhibit B) were inadmissible as proof of filiation due to non-compliance with legal requirements; (c) the oral evidence from the grandfather and mother was inconsistent, contradictory, and unbelievable, especially in light of Celestina Daldo’s affidavit denying Francisco Tan’s paternity; and (d) the mother’s character and admitted relationships with other men undermined her credibility. Public policy requires strict compliance with the law before admitting an illegitimate child into a legitimate family. Since petitioners failed to prove their case on the merits, the Supreme Court did not address other issues like res judicata.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint was affirmed. No costs.
