GR L 22761; (May, 1969) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-22761 May 31, 1969
ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed BUSH, represented in this suit by their attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH MALIG, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MARIA SANTOS BUSH, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On September 19, 1962, plaintiffs-appellants filed a complaint alleging they are the acknowledged natural children and only heirs of the deceased John T. Bush, born from his common-law relationship with Apolonia Perez. They claimed that upon John T. Bush’s death, defendant-appellee Maria Santos Bush, by falsely alleging she was the legal wife, secured her appointment as administratrix of his estate in Testate Proceedings No. 29932. She submitted a project of partition based on a will bequeathing the estate to herself and two others. Plaintiffs alleged they discovered this fraud only in July 1962. They prayed for annulment of the project of partition, an inventory and accounting, a new partition adjudicating their share, or payment of the market value if properties were disposed of, plus damages and attorney’s fees. The defendant moved to dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action, res judicata, and statute of limitations, which the lower court denied as not indubitable. After filing an answer reiterating affirmative defenses, the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss challenging the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the action to annul a project of partition approved by the probate court fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of that probate court under Rule 75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1). The lower court granted the motion but dismissed the complaint on a different ground—that the action had prescribed—which was not alleged in the second motion. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal.
ISSUE
1. Whether the lower court could dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss.
2. Whether the action had prescribed under Article 137 of the Civil Code.
3. Whether the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the action because it involved annulment of a project of partition approved by the probate court.
RULING
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court could not properly dismiss the action on the ground of prescription, which was not alleged in the motion to dismiss. Citing Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, the Court held that a court may only dismiss an action on grounds provided in the Rules of Court upon a proper motion, except in specific instances not applicable here. Dismissing the case on an unalleged ground, without giving plaintiffs a chance to argue it, was improper. Furthermore, the ground of prescription was not indubitable on the face of the complaint, as plaintiffs alleged they were already acknowledged natural children, not that they were seeking acknowledgment, making Article 137 of the Civil Code (which limits actions for acknowledgment to the lifetime of the putative parent) not clearly applicable.
2. On the issue of prescription, the Court found it was not indubitably applicable. The complaint alleged plaintiffs were already acknowledged children, so their action was for recovery of inheritance based on fraud, not for acknowledgment, rendering Article 137 of the Civil Code inapplicable on its face.
3. The Court ruled that the lower court had jurisdiction. The defendant’s reliance on Rule 75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1) was misplaced, as that rule concerns venue and exclusive jurisdiction for settlement of estate proceedings, not for an independent action for recovery of property. The Court characterized the action as essentially one for recovery of the plaintiffs’ alleged share in the inheritance from which they were defrauded, which could be pursued in an ordinary civil action without necessarily annulling the partition or reopening the estate proceedings. Therefore, the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings on the merits.
