GR L 22645; (September, 1967) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-22645 September 18, 1967
CARLOS CALUBAYAN and EMILIA FERRER, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. CIRILO PASCUAL, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Plaintiffs-appellants Carlos Calubayan and Emilia Ferrer are the registered owners of two parcels of land in Caloocan City, which they purchased from Philippine Realty Corporation on October 22, 1957. The defendant-appellee, Cirilo Pascual, was occupying a portion of the land as a squatter. Upon acquisition, the plaintiffs notified the defendant on several occasions that they were the new owners and requested him to see them to arrange for his continued use of the land. The defendant ignored these requests. On February 2, 1963, the plaintiffs formally demanded in writing that the defendant vacate the land within twenty days. The defendant received this demand on February 7, 1963, but refused to vacate. The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on May 6, 1963. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction, arguing the action was for ejectment and was filed less than one year from the demand to vacate. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
ISSUE
Whether the action, based on the averments of the complaint, is one for ejectment (unlawful detainer) cognizable by the inferior court, or for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, holding that the action was one for ejectment (unlawful detainer) within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior court. The Court ruled that the defendant’s possession was by the tolerance or permission of the plaintiffs, creating an implied promise to vacate upon demand. The one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer action is counted from the date of the demand to vacate. The effective demand in this case was made on February 2, 1963. The complaint, filed on May 6, 1963, was within one year from that demand. Therefore, the case was properly one for ejectment. The allegation of ownership in the complaint was merely to show the character of the plaintiffs’ possession and did not convert the action into one for recovery of possession within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The plaintiffs’ remedy was to file the ejectment case in the proper inferior court.
