G.R. No. L-22545 November 28, 1969
BALDOMERO S. LUQUE AND OTHER PASSENGERS FROM THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE AND BATANGAS; AND PUBLIC SERVICE OPERATORS FILOMENA ABALOS, AND OTHERS, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, MAYOR OF MANILA; MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA; MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT; HON. ENRIQUE MEDINA, PSC COMMISSIONER; PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; SAULOG TRANSIT, INC.; AND BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, consisting of passengers from Cavite and Batangas and various public service operators, challenged the constitutionality and legality of two bus ban measures: (1) Manila City Ordinance No. 4986, approved July 13, 1964, which rerouted traffic and restricted provincial passenger buses and jeepneys (PUB and PUJ) to specific entry points and routes within Manila, allowing loading and unloading only at designated areas like Harrison Boulevard, and establishing a flexible shuttle bus service; and (2) Public Service Commission (PSC) Commissioner Enrique Medina’s Administrative Order No. 1 (dated February 7, 1964) and Administrative Order No. 3 (dated April 21, 1964), which similarly restricted provincial vehicles, requiring markings (“For Provincial Operation”), limiting the number of units allowed to enter Manila (e.g., 10% generally, 15% for those within a 50km radius), and specifying loading/unloading zones. Petitioners argued these measures were unconstitutional, illegal, and unjust, amending their certificates of public convenience without notice and hearing, and causing undue inconvenience.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether Ordinance No. 4986 and the PSC Administrative Orders are constitutional and valid exercises of police power, or whether they unlawfully amend certificates of public convenience and constitute an arbitrary and oppressive use of authority.

RULING

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the measures. Citing its prior decision in Lagman vs. City of Manila, the Court ruled that the City of Manila’s power to enact traffic regulations under Section 18(hh) of its Revised Charter (Republic Act No. 409) is a valid exercise of police power for public welfare, specifically to alleviate traffic congestion. This power is superior to and not superseded by the regulatory authority of the PSC under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146). The PSC’s power to amend certificates of public convenience (Section 16[m]) is subordinate to the city’s police power over its streets. The measures are reasonable and not oppressive, as they are based on factual findings of traffic necessity and provide alternative shuttle services. The Court also found that the PSC’s administrative orders, issued under its supervisory powers (Section 17[j]), were a proper complement to the city’s ordinance and did not constitute an unlawful amendment of certificates. The petition was dismissed.