G.R. No. L-22333 February 27, 1969
LUCIANO AZUR and NICOLAS BULALACAO, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD, THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER, THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN, CAMARINES SUR, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioners-appellants Luciano Azur and Nicolas Bulalacao, along with another (who later withdrew), were provincial guards in Camarines Sur who had held their positions continuously for over five years. They filed a complaint for reinstatement, collection of salaries, and damages against the Provincial Board and other provincial officials. They alleged that their positions were abolished by Provincial Board Resolution No. 16, series of 1960, as amended by Resolution No. 45, which reduced the number of provincial guard positions from 45 to 35 “in order to economize,” subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance. They contended that the real purpose was not economy but to replace them with individuals from the political party of the new provincial administration, as evidenced by the hiring of five new provincial guards soon after their separation. They further alleged that they continued to render service from February 15, 1960, but were not paid their salaries, and that their separation was illegal. The respondents-appellees, in their answer and subsequent motion to dismiss, argued that the complaint stated no cause of action, as the petitioners were temporary employees not entitled to reinstatement, the abolition of positions was legal, and the petitioners had not exhausted administrative remedies. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint stated no cause of action because the petitioners alleged they were still rendering service (thus not entitled to reinstatement) and were merely temporary employees whose appointments could be terminated at pleasure. The petitioners appealed this dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action.

RULING

Yes, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court held that for a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint, and the hypothetical truth of the alleged facts must be admitted. Examining the complaint, the petitioners alleged ultimate facts showing a right to their positions (duly appointed and holding them for over five years), a violation of that right by a bad faith abolition of their positions (under the pretext of economy but actually for political replacement), and resulting injury (non-payment of salaries and disemployment). If these alleged facts were proven true, they would constitute a cause of action entitling the petitioners to the reliefs of reinstatement and payment of back salaries. The apparent inconsistency in the complaint—that the petitioners claimed both termination of service and continuous rendering of service—did not warrant dismissal, as a cause of action could still be made out from the allegations. The complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears certain that no relief could be granted under any state of provable facts within the allegations. Furthermore, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply, as one exception is when the controverted act is patently illegal, which was the petitioners’ precise allegation. Therefore, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action.