GR L 22013; (November, 1969) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-22013 November 28, 1969
PASTOR ESCALANTE, petitioner-appellant, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO as Civil Service Commissioner, HON. ALEJANDRO ROCES as Secretary of Education and BENIGNO ALDANA as Director of Public Schools, respondents-appellees.
FACTS
Petitioner Pastor Escalante was a Division Superintendent of Schools. In 1959, the Director of Public Schools advised him of irregularities in the purchase of carpentry tools based on an audit report and required him to explain why no administrative action should be taken against him for: (1) not utilizing industrial arts supervisors in processing requisitions; (2) circumventing rules by splitting requisitions to less than P2,000; (3) purchasing tools at exorbitant prices without consulting local officials; and (4) keeping tools unused in bodegas. Petitioner submitted his explanation. After a formal investigation, special investigators submitted a report dated September 29, 1960, finding petitioner had substantially complied with regulations and recommending the charges be dropped, with an admonition to comply more faithfully. The Director of Public Schools and the Acting Secretary of Education concurred. On April 18, 1962, G.G. de Jesus, Department Legal Counsel of the Civil Service Commission, rendered a “decision” for the Commissioner, adopting the findings, dropping the charges, and admonishing petitioner. Petitioner received notice on the same date. Over nine months later, on February 8, 1963, respondent Abelardo Subido, as Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, issued an order declaring the delegation of authority to the Department Legal Counsel void, declaring the April 18, 1962 decision void, finding petitioner guilty as charged upon review of the evidence, and ordering his dismissal effective immediately. Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking prohibition and injunction. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE
1. Whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies, given the circumstances of the case.
2. Whether the authority to render the decision of April 18, 1962 could be validly delegated to the Department Legal Counsel of the Civil Service Commission.
3. Whether the decision of April 18, 1962 was subject to review by the Commissioner of Civil Service on February 8, 1963.
RULING
1. No, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply. The case falls under exceptions to the rule, as it involves purely legal questions and calls for urgent action. The order complained of directed immediate execution of the dismissal, and the issues presented are purely legal in nature.
2. Yes, the authority could be validly delegated. Section 20 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 ( Republic Act No. 2260 ) authorizes the Commissioner to delegate authority to act on personnel matters to Chiefs of Divisions or other heads of primary units in the Civil Service Commission, among others, in accordance with standards, guidelines, and regulations. This provision permits the delegation of non-ministerial duties involving discretion. The contrary interpretation would render the provision futile and create an absurd situation where the bulk of the Commission’s personnel would have no duties.
3. No, the decision of April 18, 1962 was no longer subject to review by the Commissioner on February 8, 1963. When the Department Legal Counsel rendered the decision pursuant to lawful delegation, he acted for and on behalf of the Commissioner, and his decision is, in legal contemplation, that of the Commissioner. Pursuant to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 2260 , such a decision may be appealed by the respondent to the Civil Service Board of Appeals within thirty (30) days after receipt. Petitioner received the decision on April 18, 1962, and it became final on May 18, 1962. Therefore, the Commissioner had no more authority to revise or modify it on February 8, 1963, making his order null and void.
The decision of the trial court is reversed. A new judgment is entered perpetually prohibiting respondents from enforcing the order of February 8, 1963.
