G.R. No. L-22002 July 20, 1968
CANUTO A. LIM, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. TOMAS V. SABARRE, as Justice of the Peace of Calbiga, Samar, et al., respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioners-appellants Canuto A. Lim and Lorenzo Alcoy, along with their crew members, were accused in the Justice of the Peace Court of Calbiga, Samar, of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 20, series of 1956, which prohibited trawl fishing. They pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to quash the complaints, alleging that the ordinance had been disapproved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on March 12, 1957. Respondent Justice of the Peace Tomas V. Sabarre denied the motion and set the cases for trial. Subsequently, appellants filed an action in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Samar against Sabarre, the Municipal Mayor, and the Municipal Treasurer for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction. They sought to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance and the hearing of the criminal cases, annul the ordinance, compel Sabarre to quash the complaints, secure a refund of fees collected under the ordinance, and recover damages. Respondents, in their answer, asserted that the complaint stated no cause of action and that no written notice of the Secretary’s alleged disapproval had been given to the Municipal Council. The CFI dismissed the complaint, holding that Sabarre should be allowed to hear and decide the criminal cases, that appellants could appeal from his decision, and that they therefore had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Appellants’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the complaint for prohibition and mandamus, thereby refusing to restrain the Justice of the Peace from proceeding with the criminal cases based on the allegedly invalid municipal ordinance.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal. The Court held that a writ of prohibition will not issue unless the respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. A writ of mandamus is proper only to compel a clear legal duty, not to control judgment or discretion. The denial of a motion to quash, which is addressed to the court’s discretion, is not reviewable by prohibition. In this case, respondent Sabarre did not act without jurisdiction, in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash, as appellants’ premise—that the ordinance was disapproved—was not indubitable. Appellants failed to allege when the ordinance was submitted to the Secretary, and the alleged disapproval occurred over five months after the mayor’s approval. Critically, there was no allegation, and respondents explicitly denied, that notice of disapproval was communicated to the municipal council as required by Section 4 of Act No. 4608. Appellants’ contention relied merely on hearsay. Therefore, Sabarre correctly denied the motion or could have deferred its resolution. Appellants remained free to prove the ordinance’s invalidity during the criminal trial. The CFI correctly dismissed the complaint, as the sole issue in the prohibition and mandamus case was whether Sabarre committed grave abuse of discretion based on the pleadings and facts before him at the time of his denial, not a full trial on the ordinance’s validity.