G.R. No. L-21754 October 13, 1975
HILARIO DAVIDE, petitioner-appellee, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO R. ROCES, BENIGNO ALDANA and FRUCTUOSO YANSON, respondents-appellants.

FACTS

Petitioner Hilario Davide, a District Supervisor for fourteen years, received an ad interim appointment as City Superintendent of Schools for the newly created City of Lapu-Lapu on November 6, 1961, from President Carlos P. Garcia. The Commission on Appointments confirmed this appointment on May 3, 1962. Davide took his oath, assumed office, and performed the duties of the position, with his official acts recognized by the Director of Public Schools. However, the succeeding administration of President Diosdado Macapagal, through Administrative Order No. 2 dated December 31, 1961, withdrew all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961. Relying on this order, the Assistant Executive Secretary opined that Davide’s appointment, having not been “released” by the Office of the President, was effectively withdrawn, and directed that he cease performing his duties. Consequently, the Secretary of Education authorized the Division Superintendent of Cebu to assume supervision over Lapu-Lapu City schools. Davide filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which ruled in his favor, declaring him the de jure officer. The respondents appealed.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether Administrative Order No. 2 validly nullified Davide’s ad interim appointment, which was extended prior to December 13, 1961, and later confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling in favor of Davide. The legal logic centered on the nature and validity of his appointment and the inapplicability of Administrative Order No. 2. The Court clarified that an ad interim appointment is complete once issued by the President and transmitted to the appointee; the subsequent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments relates back to the date of the original appointment, rendering it valid from its inception. Davide’s appointment was dated November 6, 1961, which was before the December 13, 1961 cutoff date specified in Administrative Order No. 2. Therefore, his appointment was not within the scope of appointments intended to be recalled by the administrative order. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the constitutional protection against removal without cause for career civil servants. Davide had assumed office and discharged his duties with recognition from higher authorities, solidifying his legal right to the position. The attempt to remove him based on the non-release of the appointment instrument was untenable, as he had in fact received a copy and acted upon it. The confirmation by the Commission on Appointments cured any prior defect and established his status as a de jure officer.