GR L 21749; (September, 1967) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-21749 September 29, 1967
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On August 17, 1960, barge L-1892, owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, was being towed down the Pasig River by its tugboats “Bangus” and “Barbero” when it rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge. The collision smashed the posts and caused the bridge to list. The river was swollen and the current swift due to heavy rains on the preceding days. The Republic of the Philippines sued the corporation for damages amounting to P200,000. The defendant disclaimed liability, arguing it exercised due diligence in selecting and supervising its employees, that the damage was caused by force majeure, that the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue, and that the bridge was an obstruction to navigation. The Court of First Instance of Manila held the defendant liable and ordered it to pay P192,561.72 for repair costs, with legal interest. The defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
1. Whether the collision was caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to introduce additional evidence after resting its case.
RULING
1. The collision was not caused by force majeure. The defense of force majeure requires an event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was inevitable. The defendant’s own precautions—assigning two powerful tugboats, competent personnel, and double-checking equipment—proved it foresaw the dangers posed by the swollen river. By voluntarily operating under those conditions, it assumed the risk. The “res ipsa loquitur” rule applies, as the ramming of a stationary bridge by a barge under the defendant’s exclusive control raises a presumption of negligence. The defendant’s argument about improperly placed bridge supports or dolphins does not exonerate it but emphasizes the need for a higher degree of care.
2. The trial court did not err in allowing additional evidence. The admission of further evidence after a party has rested lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, reviewable only for clear abuse. The plaintiff was allowed to submit vouchers supporting an already existing claim. No abuse was shown, especially since the defendant had also been granted a similar order to present additional evidence. The decision of the lower court is affirmed. Costs against the defendant-appellant.