GR L 21555; (April, 1966) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-21555; April 29, 1966
DOROTEA BALMEO, petitioner-appellant, vs. CRISANTO ARAGON, Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents-appellees.
FACTS
On February 12, 1963, the Philippine National Bank (respondent) filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila (Case No. 106249) against Dorotea Balmeo (petitioner) and two others for the revival of a default judgment rendered by the same court on January 30, 1953, in a previous case (No. 24339). On March 25, 1963, the defendants, including petitioner, moved to dismiss the revival complaint on the ground that the 1953 default judgment became final and executory on its date of rendition, and the 10-year period to file an action for revival had already lapsed. The respondent bank opposed the motion, alleging that the defendants had made several installment payments on the judgment debt upon demand, which tolled the prescriptive period, making the revival suit timely filed. The opposition included documents evidencing these demands and payments. On April 16, 1963, the respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss and maintained this ruling upon a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alone then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and/or injunction with a prayer for a preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 54339). On July 1, 1963, the respondent Judge dismissed this petition de plano, declaring it unsubstantial and not requiring an answer from the respondents. Petitioner appealed this dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila correctly dismissed the petitioner’s special civil action (certiorari, prohibition, and/or injunction) challenging the Municipal Court’s interlocutory order denying her motion to dismiss the complaint for revival of judgment.
RULING
Yes, the dismissal by the Court of First Instance was correct and is affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the petition was properly dismissed for being unsubstantial. The Municipal Court had jurisdiction over the revival action. The denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order that is not appealable and typically rests within the trial court’s sound discretion. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the Municipal Court’s order, as the respondent bank’s opposition, supported by documents alleging payments that could interrupt prescription, presented a factual issue requiring a trial on the merits. The petitioner had an adequate and efficacious remedy by proceeding to trial in the Municipal Court and, if aggrieved by the final judgment, appealing therefrom. To entertain the special civil action would sanction unnecessary delay and encourage multiplicity of suits. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.