G.R. No. L-21274. July 31, 1963.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and SECURITY OFFICER, DETENTION STATION, ENGINEER ISLAND, Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. FELIX R. DOMINGO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, and MONICO MUYA, alias TIU KIM KEE, respondents.

FACTS

Monico Muya, alias Tiu Kim Kee, a Chinese citizen, first entered the Philippines as a stowaway in 1959 and was deported. He re-entered in 1962, claiming Filipino citizenship using a certificate from the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong. Immigration authorities, after establishing his identity via fingerprints, detained him. A Board of Special Inquiry recommended his exclusion and deportation for entry through false statements, a decision affirmed by the Board of Immigration Commissioners on June 22, 1962.
Muya initially filed a certiorari case in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Case No. 50813) to annul the deportation order but voluntarily dismissed it on July 31, 1962, on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Subsequently, on February 20, 1963, he filed a new petition in the CFI of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-1442) for Declaratory Judgment with Mandamus and Injunction, again asserting Filipino citizenship and seeking his release and restraint from deportation. The Pangasinan court issued a preliminary mandatory injunction on March 1, 1963, ordering his release.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in a declaratory judgment suit concerning citizenship and release from immigration detention.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, annulling the orders and writ issued by the respondent judge. The legal logic is threefold. First, citizenship is not a proper subject for a declaratory judgment, as firmly settled by jurisprudence. Since the principal remedy Muya sought was unavailable, the ancillary remedy of a preliminary mandatory injunction was issued in excess of jurisdiction.
Second, Muya failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The immigration authorities are under the Department of Justice, and he was obligated to appeal to the Secretary of Justice before resorting to judicial action. His prior voluntary dismissal of the Manila case acknowledged this deficiency.
Third, the proper remedy to challenge the legality of his detention was a petition for habeas corpus, not a declaratory judgment with mandamus. This habeas corpus proceeding should have been filed in the CFI of Manila, where he was physically detained, not in Pangasinan. The Court noted Muya’s inconsistent allegations of residence (Dagupan City in the Pangasinan case vs. Quezon City in the Manila case) as an apparent attempt to forum-shop, given his admitted birth in China and immediate detention upon 1962 entry. The Court emphasized the duty to prevent judicial processes from being used to circumvent immigration laws and constitutional policy, even temporarily.