GR L 20900; (May, 1967) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-20900 May 16, 1967
CAMPUA UY TINA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. DAVID P. AVILA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, First Branch; TAN CHING JI, and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF COTABATO, respondents.
FACTS
In Civil Case No. 536, the parties executed a compromise agreement, approved by the Court in a decision dated February 4, 1954. Under the agreement, defendant Campua Uy Tina obligated himself to pay plaintiff Tan Ching Ji the sum of P23,000.00 “without interest, within a period of six (6) years from date hereof.” It was stipulated that attached properties would not be released until full payment and that the defendant “during the period of six (6) years, shall hold and fully enjoy the fruits of said properties.” After the six-year period expired, plaintiff filed a motion for execution on September 20, 1960. The writ of execution was issued on August 14, 1962. Defendant moved for reconsideration and filed an ordinary action (Civil Case No. 1843) to enjoin enforcement. The court denied the motion for reconsideration and issued another writ on January 3, 1963. Defendant’s subsequent motions to quash or stay execution were denied. Defendant then filed the instant petition for certiorari to annul the writ of execution issued on August 14, 1962, and subsequent proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether the writ of execution issued on August 14, 1962, was issued within the allowable period under Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, considering that the judgment based on the compromise agreement was rendered on February 4, 1954, and the obligation was payable within a six-year term.
RULING
The writ of execution was properly issued. The decisive issue is not when the judgment became final for purposes of appeal, but when it became executory or enforceable. The judgment obligated the defendant to pay within a six-year term from February 4, 1954. Under Article 1193 of the Civil Code, an obligation with a term is demandable only when the term expires. Therefore, the judgment could only be effectively enforced after the lapse of the six-year term on February 4, 1960. The period for execution by motion under Rule 39, Section 6 (five years from entry of judgment) should be counted from the time the judgment became enforceable, not merely final. The respondent Judge’s uncontradicted statement that judgment was entered only in 1960 further supports that the writ issued in 1962 was within the five-year period. The petition is denied for being frivolous and an attempt to evade a just debt through technicalities.