G.R. No. L-209, April 30, 1946
G. VIOLA FERNANDO, petitioner-appellant, vs. CRISANTO ARAGON, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, GREGORIO NIEVA, and MARIA A. DE NIEVA, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

This is a certiorari proceeding originating from an unlawful detainer case pending in the Municipal Court of Manila. The respondents, Gregorio Nieva and Maria A. de Nieva (plaintiffs in the detainer case), leased a house to petitioner G. Viola Fernando (defendant) on a month-to-month basis beginning May 1, 1945. The lease agreement allowed termination upon thirty days’ notice and prohibited using the premises for non-residential purposes or subleasing without the lessors’ written consent. The complaint alleged that Fernando violated the contract by converting part of the premises into an automobile repair shop and subleasing portions without consent. The lessors notified Fernando in writing on May 25, 1945, of their intention to terminate the lease by June 30, 1945, later extended to July 31, 1945, at his request. Despite these notices, Fernando refused to vacate. During trial, the municipal judge, referencing a prior dismissal in a similar case for lack of an allegation on demand and failure to pay rent under Rule 72, section 2, allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The amendment added to paragraph 8 the phrase: “despite several requests made on him since July 31, 1945, and until the date of the filing of this action.” Fernando then filed this certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Manila, arguing the municipal court had no jurisdiction to allow the amendment because no rule expressly authorizes it. The lower court denied the petition, holding the judge did not exceed his jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent municipal judge exceeded his jurisdiction or acted without authority in allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in the unlawful detainer case.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding the certiorari proceeding devoid of merit. First, the amendment was unnecessary and mere surplusage. The original complaint’s allegations—that the lease was terminable on thirty days’ notice, that written notices of termination were given for specific dates due to violations, and that the defendant refused to vacate despite such notices—were sufficient to constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The Court noted that, as a month-to-month lease, it could be terminated at the end of any month even without violations. Second, although Rule 17 on amended pleadings is not expressly made applicable to justice of the peace and municipal courts, this omission cannot be interpreted as a prohibition. Proceedings in these courts are summary and do not require formal pleadings like in Courts of First Instance (e.g., no written answer is mandated). The spirit of the Rules, as stated in Rule 1, section 2, is to obtain a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination. Furthermore, Rule 124, section 6 provides that if a procedure is not specifically pointed out, any suitable process conforming to the rules’ spirit may be adopted. Therefore, the municipal judge acted within his authority in allowing the amendment. Costs were awarded against the appellant.