G.R. No. L-20723 July 30, 1969
WASHINGTON P. PONCE, petitioner-appellee, vs. EUGENIO E. VAÑO, in his capacity as City Treasurer, City of Lapu-lapu, FAUSTO DE LA SERNA, in his capacity as CITY AUDITOR, City of Lapu-lapu, JESUS IRIARTE, in his capacity as Deputy Auditor General, (GAO) and the City of Lapulapu, respondents-appellants.

FACTS

Petitioner Washington P. Ponce was the Justice of the Peace of Cordova, Cebu. On July 17, 1961, he was designated Acting Municipal Judge of the newly created Lapulapu City. On November 6, 1961, he was extended an ad interim appointment as Municipal Judge of Lapulapu City by then President Carlos P. Garcia, a copy of which was released and received by him before November 10, 1961. On December 29, 1961, his ad interim appointment was certified to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He took his oath and assumed the position on January 16, 1962. On April 27, 1962, his ad interim appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. His salary was paid from July 17, 1961, to February 1, 1962. However, on February 8, 1962, payment was withheld based on Deputy Auditor General Jesus Iriarte’s order, which relied on the Secretary of Justice’s opinion that the appointment was withdrawn by Presidential Administrative Order No. 2 dated December 21, 1961, which withdrew all appointments issued by President Garcia. After confirmation, his salary claims from February 8, 1962, onward were still refused. The case was submitted upon a stipulation of facts. The Solicitor General later filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging a mistake in the stipulation that the appointment copy was released and received before November 10, 1961, and presented a certification from the Assistant Executive Secretary dated November 11, 1963, stating the appointment “has not been released and is still in the Office.”

ISSUE

Whether petitioner’s ad interim appointment as Municipal Judge of Lapulapu City, dated November 6, 1961, and subsequently confirmed, falls within the purview of the “midnight appointments” invalidated in Aytona vs. Castillo and is thus subject to recall by Presidential Administrative Order No. 2.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, recognizing petitioner as the duly appointed Municipal Judge. The Court held that petitioner’s case is outside the ruling in Aytona vs. Castillo. The appointment was issued on November 6, 1961, before the November 14, 1961 elections, and the petitioner had already been acting in the position since July 17, 1961. The appointment was not part of the “confused scramble” or mass “midnight appointments” made in the last days of the outgoing administration, which were characterized by haste and lack of deliberate consideration. Instead, it was a singular appointment made well before the election, affording assurance of deliberate action and consideration of the appointee’s qualifications, aligning with the qualifying doctrine in Merrera vs. Liwag. The subsequent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments on April 27, 1962, further solidified its validity. The Court denied the Motion for New Trial, finding that the certification regarding the non-release of the appointment did not affect the merits of the appointment or the undisputed facts of oath-taking, assumption, and confirmation.