G.R. No. L-20438 September 27, 1966
NEW MANILA LUMBER CO., INC., petitioner, vs. FERMIN CENTINO and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Fermin Centino filed an unfair labor practice case (Case No. 2178-ULP) against petitioner New Manila Lumber Co., Inc. in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The CIR rendered a decision on March 24, 1961, ordering petitioner to reinstate Centino and pay him back wages from August 10, 1959, until actual reinstatement. This decision was affirmed by the CIR en banc on April 17, 1961, and by the Supreme Court on May 24, 1961, in G.R. No. L-18337. A writ of execution was issued on September 1, 1961.
On September 21, 1961, petitioner filed an urgent motion in the CIR to reopen the case, alleging it had discovered that Centino was employed by Manila Mahogany Manufacturing Corporation during the pendency of the ULP case, and thus his earnings should be deducted from the back wages. The motion also sought a hearing on the issue and claimed a further study showed Centino was not entitled to reinstatement. The motion was heard on June 7, 1962, where petitioner presented evidence on Centino’s earnings from Manila Mahogany. After presenting this evidence, petitioner orally moved for a continuance to present evidence of Centino’s earnings from other establishments, which the trial judge denied verbally and later in a written order on June 20, 1962. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CIR en banc on July 17, 1962.
On August 16, 1962, Centino filed an ex parte motion for partial execution. The CIR, without a hearing, issued an order on September 8, 1962, granting execution and directing computation of back wages from August 10, 1959, to September 27, 1961, deducting P226.95 earned from Manila Mahogany. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CIR en banc on October 2, 1962. Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Industrial Relations committed a grave abuse of discretion: (1) in holding that its order of June 7, 1962, had become final and executory; (2) in denying petitioner’s motion to adduce evidence on Centino’s deductible earnings from other firms; and (3) in issuing the writ of execution without previously giving petitioner its day in court.

RULING

The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it.
1. The CIR did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The decision in Case No. 2178-ULP had long become final and executory. The CIR, exercising its powers under Sections 14 and 17 of Commonwealth Act 103, entertained petitioner’s urgent motion regarding deductible earnings. The orders of June 7, 1962, and July 17, 1962, which determined the deductible earnings (specifically the P226.95 from Manila Mahogany), became final as petitioner did not appeal from them. These orders were corollary to the final decision, and thus execution could properly issue.
2. The denial of petitioner’s motion to adduce evidence on earnings from other firms was not an abuse of discretion. The urgent motion specifically alleged earnings only from Manila Mahogany Manufacturing Corporation. Under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act 103, the CIR’s power to modify or reopen a decision can only be exercised upon grounds coming into existence after the decision was rendered, not upon grounds that were or could have been available during the original hearings. Earnings from other companies were not alleged in the urgent motion and allowing such evidence would lead to vexatious repetitions.
3. The issuance of the writ of execution without notice or hearing was proper. Execution should issue as a matter of right upon a final judgment or order. Section 23 of Commonwealth Act 103 provides for enforcement of final orders, and Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states execution shall issue as a matter of right upon expiration of the appeal period if no appeal is perfected. The CIR can order execution ex parte or motu proprio once a decision is final. The matters had been finally disposed of, and no further hearing was necessary.
The writ of certiorari was denied, with costs against petitioner.