G.R. No. L-20370; November 29, 1963
CONRADO ESPINOSA SIGUIENTE, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE JUDICIAL SUPERVISOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE CHIEF ACCOUNTING OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE DISTRICT JUDGE OF SULU and ATTY. MARIANO MANAGULA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Conrado Espinosa Siguiente sought mandamus and prohibition to compel his recognition as Justice of the Peace of Balimbing, Sulu, and payment of corresponding salary. His claim was based on a sequence of events involving an ad-interim appointment dated May 19, 1961, purportedly signed by then-President Carlos P. Garcia. This appointment was included in a list submitted by President Garcia to the Commission on Appointments on December 26, 1961, for confirmation. The Commission on Appointments subsequently confirmed this appointment on May 3, 1962, and petitioner took his oath on May 18, 1962.
However, it was uncontroverted that the physical document of the ad-interim appointment bearing President Garcia’s signature was never released from Malacañang or delivered to the petitioner prior to the confirmation. Furthermore, President Diosdado Macapagal, who assumed office on December 30, 1961, had already issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961, revoking all appointments extended or released by his predecessor after December 13, 1961. The petitioner had no knowledge of the appointment before its confirmation.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner validly acquired a right to the office of Justice of the Peace of Balimbing, Sulu, entitling him to the writs sought.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The legal logic centered on the invalidity of the underlying appointment and the nature of the presidential act. First, the Court characterized the appointment as one of the “midnight appointments” revoked by President Macapagal’s Administrative Order No. 2, the validity of which was upheld in the precedent of Aytona v. Castillo. Second, and more fundamentally, the Court ruled that no valid ad-interim appointment ever existed because the signed document was never released or delivered; thus, the petitioner had not qualified for the office at the time of the Commission’s confirmation. The confirmation was therefore a mistake based on a non-existent appointment.
The Court further reasoned that President Garcia’s letter of December 26, 1961, could not be construed as a valid nomination. A President cannot make a prospective appointment intended to take effect after the expiration of his own term, as this would improperly forestall the prerogatives of his successor. Since President Garcia’s term ended on December 30, 1961, and the Commission on Appointments was to meet in January 1962, any effective appointment would necessarily occur after he had ceased to be President, which he had no authority to do. Consequently, the petitioner acquired no vested right to the office. The preliminary injunction was dissolved.