G.R. No. L-20292 November 27, 1967
DOLORES BENEDICTO and RICARDO GEMORA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PANTALEON CAÑADA and VISITACION MARINAS, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

This is an appeal from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in a forcible entry and detainer case originally filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Sipalay. The plaintiffs sought to recover possession of a portion of Lot No. 4120, awarded to plaintiff Dolores Benedicto by the Director of Lands. The justice of the peace court dismissed the complaint, prompting an appeal to the Court of First Instance. The defendants were declared in default, and the court rendered a decision ordering them to vacate the land and pay an annual sum. An alias writ of execution was issued, and the Provincial Sheriff removed the defendants’ house on July 29, 1959. Shortly afterwards, the defendants reentered the premises and rebuilt their dwelling. On January 6, 1962, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt. The defendants failed to appear at the hearing, leading to an order for their arrest. On May 4, 1962, after hearing the defendants’ explanation, the court issued an order lifting the arrest and releasing them. The plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the court in its order of June 30, 1962, which stated that the plaintiffs’ delay of about two and a half years in filing the contempt motion implied that the re-entry was blessed or tolerated by them, and that their proper remedy was a new action for recovery of possession, not a motion for contempt.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in: (1) issuing the order dated May 4, 1962 lifting the order of arrest and releasing the defendants; (2) denying the motion for reconsideration upon the ground that the motion for contempt was filed two and a half years after the alleged re-entry; and (3) holding that the plaintiffs’ remedy would be a new action for recovery of possession, not a motion for contempt.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court. The Court held that while the lower court had the authority to entertain a charge for indirect contempt even after a lapse of time (as per Rule 64, Section 3(h) of the old Rules, now Rule 71, Section 3(b)), the lower court dismissed the charge not for lack of authority but based on its factual conclusion that the plaintiffs’ delay implied consent or tolerance of the re-entry. This conclusion of fact cannot be reviewed in an appeal limited to questions of law. Furthermore, consent or acquiescence by the complainant is a sufficient defense to a charge of contempt. Additionally, contempt proceedings are penal in nature, and an appeal does not lie from an order of dismissal or exoneration, as it amounts to a virtual acquittal. Therefore, the orders of May 4, 1962 and June 30, 1962 were affirmed.