G.R. No. L-20148; April 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. PABLO LEE alias ENG JIO, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

The petitioner-appellee, Pablo Lee alias Eng Jio, filed an application for naturalization as a Filipino citizen in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The trial court granted his petition. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed the decision. The State argued that the trial court erred in not properly considering the petitioner’s unauthorized use of an alias and in incorrectly finding that the petitioner had a lucrative trade, profession, or occupation. The evidence revealed that the petitioner used the names Pablo Lee and Eng Jio, the latter as an alias, without showing authorization as required by Commonwealth Act No. 142 (the Alias Law). Regarding his occupation, the petitioner testified he was a graduate engineer employed by Lu Tai Lumber Co. with a monthly stipend of P250.00 plus free board and lodging. He owned no real property. It was shown that the Lumber Company was owned by a partnership in which his father had an interest, and the petitioner, who was single, lived with his parents. The company’s certification of employment did not specify a salary, and the income tax returns he submitted were for the year 1961, which was after he filed his application in November 1960.

ISSUE

1. Whether the petitioner’s unauthorized use of an alias constitutes disqualifying conduct for naturalization.
2. Whether the petitioner possessed a lucrative trade, profession, or occupation at the time of his application, as required by law.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the application for naturalization. On the first issue, the Court ruled that the unauthorized use of an alias, without the required authorization under Commonwealth Act No. 142 , constitutes conduct that is not irreproachable and is a disqualifying ground for naturalization, citing precedents such as Wang I Fu vs. Republic. On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioner failed to prove he had a lucrative occupation at the time of his application. His claimed income from employment in a company where his father had an interest was deemed insufficient and dubious, especially since the income tax returns presented were from a period after his application was filed. The Court emphasized that the qualifications must be possessed at the time of application, not subsequently, and cited Que Choc Gui vs. Republic to support the ruling that such an income is insufficient to establish a lucrative calling. The Court concluded that the petitioner did not fully satisfy all the qualifications required by law.