G.R. No. L-19795, July 30, 1964
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Bienvenido Villarin, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The case originated from a complaint for acts of lasciviousness with consent filed by Florentina Hanohan, a 15-year-old, against Bienvenido Villarin in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malimono, Surigao. After trial, the court found Villarin guilty and sentenced him accordingly. Villarin appealed to the Court of First Instance. Instead of proceeding on the original complaint, the provincial fiscal filed a new information charging Villarin with corruption of a minor under Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code. Villarin pleaded not guilty to this new charge.
Subsequently, Villarin’s counsel filed a motion to quash the information, arguing it did not allege facts constituting the crime charged. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present appeal by the government, which argued that the filing of a new information on appeal was unnecessary and improper, and that the dismissal was erroneous.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the case, after the accused had pleaded not guilty to a new information filed on appeal, places the accused in double jeopardy, thereby barring further prosecution.

RULING

Yes, the dismissal constituted double jeopardy, barring any further appeal or remand. The Supreme Court clarified the procedural rule: when a case is appealed from a justice of the peace court to the Court of First Instance, the judgment is vacated, and the case is tried de novo. The prosecution may stand on the original complaint or file a new information, but it cannot change the nature of the offense charged. Here, the fiscal improperly filed a new information for corruption of a minor, which was a different offense from the original charge of acts of lasciviousness with consent.
Despite this error, the trial court acquired jurisdiction when it allowed the new information and arraigned the accused. The court then erred in dismissing the case upon the accused’s motion to quash. Crucially, this dismissal was without the express consent of the accused, as it was based on his counsel’s motion challenging the validity of the information. Under the rules on double jeopardy, a dismissal without the accused’s express consent, even if erroneous, bars further prosecution. The Court found that the essential allegations in both the original complaint and the new information still constituted acts of lasciviousness, meaning the case could have proceeded on appeal. However, the erroneous dismissal, once effected, placed the accused in jeopardy, and this could not be remedied by remanding the case. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.