G.R. No. L-19593; May 10, 1962
DELFIN B. ALBANO, petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF ISABELA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

The provincial board of canvassers of Isabela suspended its canvass for the congressional election upon order of the Commission on Elections. Petitioner Delfin B. Albano, invoking the reservation in a prior Supreme Court decision (Albano v. Arranz, G.R. No. L-19260), filed a petition for judicial recount under Section 163 of the Revised Election Code. He alleged discrepancies in election returns from several precincts. The Court of First Instance (CFI) granted the petition, opened the ballot boxes, and conducted a recount. The recount confirmed Albano’s allegation of falsification in the returns.
Despite this confirmation, the CFI dismissed Albano’s petition. It ruled motu proprio that Albano failed to present evidence proving the recount would affect the election’s result. Albano filed a motion for new trial, arguing the issue was not genuinely contested and that the completed recount itself was proof. He also offered to submit additional evidence. The CFI denied his motions on procedural grounds, prompting Albano to file this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for judicial recount after confirming the falsification of returns, on the ground that the petitioner did not present separate evidence that the recount would affect the election result.

RULING

No, the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion. The dismissal was based on a misapplication of legal technicalities that defeated the purpose of the summary recount proceeding under Section 163. The legal logic is clear. First, the factual premise for the recount was already established. The prior Supreme Court decision in Albano v. Arranz implicitly acknowledged that the alleged alteration, if proven, would operate to Albano’s detriment, meaning it would affect the result. Second, and decisively, the CFI’s own completed recount, which “resulted in the complete and exact confirmation” of the falsification, constituted the very proof that the election result was implicated. Requiring additional evidence on this point after the recount’s confirmation was illogical and contrary to the summary nature of the proceeding.
The Supreme Court emphasized that a Section 163 proceeding is restrictive and summary, intended for the mathematical counting of votes to determine the true return, not for the appreciation of ballots or determination of validity as in an election contest. Its purpose is to offer prompt relief and dispel doubts. By dismissing the petition after a confirmatory recount on a technicality not genuinely raised by the opposing party, the CFI frustrated this legislative intent. The precedent of Chiongbian v. CFI of Misamis Occidental was distinguished, as it involved tampered ballot boxes rendering a recount futile, a circumstance not present here. The writs were granted, setting aside the CFI’s orders and directing it to declare the recount result for transmission to the board of canvassers.