G.R. No. L-19576 April 29, 1966
Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Macondray and Co., defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Immigration, imposed an administrative fine of P500.00 upon Macondray & Co., Inc., as agent of the vessel SS “Titania,” for a violation of Section 44 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The violation, committed on June 11, 1955, consisted of the failure to include an alien stowaway in the passenger manifest and to prevent his landing in Manila. On September 6, 1961, the Republic filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila to collect the fine. Macondray moved to dismiss on the ground of prescription, citing Section 44(f) of the same Act, which bars enforcement actions filed more than five years after the violation. The Municipal Court dismissed the case, and the Court of First Instance of Manila affirmed the dismissal upon appeal, prompting the Republic’s appeal to the Supreme Court. The record shows that on April 11, 1960 (two months before the five-year prescriptive period expired on June 11, 1960), the Solicitor General made a written demand for payment. Macondray replied on April 19, 1960, informing the Solicitor General that it had appealed the fine to the Secretary of Justice the previous day and requesting that court action be held in abeyance pending the appeal’s resolution. No court action was filed until after the prescriptive period had lapsed.

ISSUE

Whether the action for collection of the administrative fine is barred by the statute of limitations, considering Macondray’s request to hold court action in abeyance pending its administrative appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings. The Court held that Macondray is estopped from invoking the defense of prescription. The inaction in filing the court case within the prescriptive period was due entirely to Macondray’s express request to hold action in abeyance pending its appeal to the Secretary of Justice. Although the Solicitor General did not expressly grant the request, it impliedly did so by not immediately filing suit. The Court further ruled that the lower court should have considered the allegations in the Republic’s answer to the motion to dismiss, which contained the facts justifying the presentation of evidence on the suspension of the prescriptive period, or should have received evidence on the matter before resolving the motion to dismiss.