G.R. No. L-19360; July 26, 1963
SILVESTRA DEYMOS VDA. DE OYZON, petitioner, vs. HON. DEMETRIO G. VINZON, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Carigara, Leyte, and CATALINO PANAO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Silvestra Deymos Vda. de Oyzon lost in a civil case for annulment of contract in the Court of First Instance. She received notice of the adverse decision on October 4, 1961. On October 18, 1961, within the 30-day reglementary period to appeal, she filed her Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond, and Record on Appeal. The respondent judge, however, did not immediately approve the Record on Appeal. Instead, during hearings on October 21 and 28, 1961, the court ordered petitioner to incorporate additional documents into the Record on Appeal, including a disputed document and later a motion for ocular inspection and related reports. The court’s October 28 order gave no specific deadline, stating only that after compliance, the record would be approved ipso facto.
Petitioner complied by filing an Amended Record on Appeal on November 11, 1961. However, the respondent judge, in an order dated November 18, denied its approval, ruling that the appeal was not perfected within the 30-day period which ended on November 4, and that the court had lost jurisdiction. The judge denied reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, arguing the judge gravely abused his discretion in refusing to approve the amended record and give due course to her appeal.

ISSUE

Was the petitioner’s appeal perfected on time, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the appellate court?

RULING

Yes, the appeal was perfected on time. The Supreme Court granted the writ, set aside the respondent judge’s orders, and directed him to approve the Amended Record on Appeal and give due course to the appeal. The legal logic centers on the doctrine that an amended record on appeal relates back to the filing date of the original, timely filed record. Petitioner filed her original Record on Appeal on October 18, 1961, well within the 30-day period from notice of judgment. The subsequent amendments, which incorporated additional pleadings as ordered by the court, did not nullify this timely filing. The court’s October 28 order did not set a specific period for compliance, implying it should be done within a reasonable time. Compliance within 14 days (by November 11) was reasonable.
Crucially, an amendment presupposes the existence of something to be amended. Therefore, the perfection of the appeal tolled from the date of the original filing, not from the date of the amendment. The Amended Record on Appeal is deemed filed as of October 18, 1961. The respondent judge erred in considering the November 11 filing date as the date of perfection. His refusal to approve the amended record, based on the mistaken belief that the reglementary period had lapsed, constituted a grave abuse of discretion, as it unlawfully deprived petitioner of her right to appeal. The preliminary injunction was made permanent.