GR L 19327; (April, 1966) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-19327 April 29, 1966
AMADO BELLA JARO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. ELPIDIO VALENCIA, Secretary of Health and HON. JESUS NOLASCO, Director of Health Services, respondents-appellees.
FACTS
On August 30, 1960, petitioner Amado Bella Jaro filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Secretary of Health and the Director of Health Services to compel them to return him to his original station at Cateel, Davao as municipal health officer and to declare null and void Special Order No. 2 dated February 11, 1959, which temporarily assigned him as rural health physician of the Municipality of Padada, Davao. The trial court rendered judgment on March 25, 1961, declaring the Special Order null and void, ordering payment of Jaro’s back salaries, and dismissing the respondents’ counterclaim. Both parties appealed. The respondents’ appeal (G.R. No. L-18352) raised purely questions of law, while Jaro’s appeal to the Court of Appeals raised the issue of bad faith and the denial of moral damages and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals elevated Jaro’s appeal to the Supreme Court for joint disposition with the respondents’ appeal. On August 30, 1963, in G.R. No. L-18352, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, upholding the validity of Jaro’s transfer from Cateel to Padada, Davao, on the ground that his appointment was as a physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals, without a specific station, and therefore he could be transferred as deemed necessary by the Secretary of Health.
ISSUE
Whether the respondents acted in bad faith in issuing Special Order No. 2 transferring petitioner Jaro, thereby justifying an award for moral damages and attorney’s fees.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the lower court’s decision covered by petitioner Jaro’s appeal. The Court held that since the validity of the transfer order had been upheld in the related case (G.R. No. L-18352), the respondents could not be held to have acted in bad faith. There was a lack of sufficient evidence showing that the respondents acted arbitrarily or were inspired by purely personal motives in ordering the transfer. Therefore, the denial of moral damages and attorney’s fees was proper. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.