G.R. No. L-19326; July 31, 1964
Petra de la Cruz, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Lucio M. Tianco, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Pasay City, Restituto N. Ascano, as City Engineer of Pasay and the Sheriff of Pasay City, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Petra de la Cruz was convicted in the Municipal Court of Pasay City for violating Section 30, Article X of Republic Act No. 917 (the Pasay City Charter) by constructing a house on a portion of Highway 54. She was sentenced to pay a fine and, notably, ordered to remove her house from the highway, with authority given to the City Engineer to effect removal upon her failure. De la Cruz paid the fine but did not remove the house. The judgment became final. Subsequently, the municipal court, upon motion, issued an order for demolition. De la Cruz then filed a petition for certiorari with injunction in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, arguing that the municipal court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the removal of the house as part of the criminal penalty.
The CFI dismissed her petition. It held that while an old doctrine (Carol and Ballesteros v. Paredes) suggested a court could not order such removal in the absence of express statutory authority, subsequent rulings and laws had altered the legal landscape. The CFI found the municipal court’s order proper, emphasizing that the illegal construction was a nuisance and the court had inherent powers to order its abatement. De la Cruz appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the municipal court, in a criminal case for violation of a city charter, legally exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the accused to remove her illegally constructed house from a public highway as part of the penalty.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the CFI’s decision, ruling that the municipal court acted within its authority. The Court clarified that this was not an ordinary ejectment case requiring a separate civil action. The illegal construction on a public highway constituted a nuisance per se. Following established jurisprudence, such nuisances can be abated or removed by the government. The criminal conviction provided the requisite due process; de la Cruz had her day in court. The order for removal was a logical and necessary consequence of the finding of illegality, serving to abate the nuisance and restore public property. The Court rejected the appellant’s technical arguments, stating that squatters cannot obstruct public infrastructure projects by invoking such technicalities. The penalty of fine combined with the removal order was deemed a valid exercise of the court’s power to fully address the offense and its continuing harmful effects on public use of the highway.