GR L 19281; (June, 1965) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, vs. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
FACTS
Pedro Santillon died intestate on November 21, 1953, in Tayug, Pangasinan, leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda, and his only legitimate son, Claro Santillon. The properties left were acquired during the marriage. Claro filed a petition for letters of administration, which was opposed by Perfecta and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales. Perfecta was later appointed administratrix. Commissioners were appointed to draft a project of partition. Claro filed a motion to declare the shares of the heirs, invoking Article 892 of the New Civil Code, claiming that after deducting Perfecta’s conjugal half, the remaining half should be divided with Perfecta getting 1/4 and himself getting 3/4. Perfecta, invoking Article 996 of the New Civil Code, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled to one-half of the remaining half, resulting in an equal division of the estate between them. The lower court ruled in favor of Perfecta, ordering that she and Claro each inherit one-half of the estate after deducting her conjugal share. Claro appealed.
ISSUE
1. Whether the order of the lower court specifying the distributive shares of the heirs is appealable.
2. How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
RULING
1. Yes, the order is appealable. Under Rule 109, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an order that determines the distributive share of an estate to which a person is entitled is a final order and appealable.
2. The estate shall be divided equally between the surviving spouse and the only legitimate child. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order. Article 996 of the New Civil Code, which governs legal or intestate succession, applies. The Court held that the plural word “children” in Article 996 includes the singular “child” under the rule of statutory construction. Therefore, when a widow or widower survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate equally. The Court rejected the appellant’s reliance on Article 892, which governs testamentary succession and fixes legitimes, as inapplicable to intestate proceedings. The Court also addressed the argument of unfairness, noting that while in testate succession a widow may be given only one-fourth if the testator so decides, in intestacy, the clear mandate of Article 996 for equal sharing must be enforced.