G.R. Nos. L-18932-33-34, L-19024-35, L-19036-44. September 30, 1963.
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. LIBERATO JARAMILLO, ET AL., JUANITA VERSOZA, ET AL., and GREGORIO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
These consolidated petitions originated from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The respondents were occupants of lots within the Tatalon Estate, owned by petitioner J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., which held a Torrens title. The petitioner had filed numerous ejectment suits in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against these occupants to recover possession. The defendants were served summons, and the cases proceeded: some answered and appeared at trial, some answered but did not appear, and others were declared in default. In all cases, the trial court rendered judgments ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and pay rentals. These judgments became final and executory as no appeals were taken. The petitioner then sought execution.
To prevent execution, the occupants filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. They argued, inter alia, that they were purchasers in good faith from the “Deudors” (original claimants to the estate); that under a 1953 compromise agreement between Tuason and the Deudors, Tuason could not eject them until it had fully paid the Deudors; and that expropriation proceedings over the estate were allegedly pending. The Court of Appeals granted the writs for those occupants who were listed as buyers in the compromise agreement and had filed actions to enforce their rights, ruling they could not be ejected until their rights were finally determined in a separate pending action.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing writs of certiorari and prohibition to suspend the execution of final and executory judgments of ejectment.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petitioner’s certiorari, annulled the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the executability of the ejectment judgments. The legal logic is clear and multi-faceted. First, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs. A writ of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Since the judgments of the trial court in the ejectment cases had long become final and executory, they were beyond review via certiorari. The proper remedy against a final judgment is not certiorari but a direct attack in the court that rendered it, such as a petition for relief from judgment, which was not availed of here.
Second, the substantive defenses raised by the occupants lacked merit. The claim that Tuason could not eject them until it paid the Deudors in full under the compromise agreement was rejected. The respondents were not parties to that agreement and had no right to demand its fulfillment. Moreover, this Court had previously ruled that the Deudors’ failure to perform their own obligations rendered Tuason’s duty to pay unenforceable. Finally, the alleged expropriation proceedings did not bar execution. Mere filing of condemnation proceedings does not suspend the landowner’s dominical rights, including the right to enforce a final ejectment judgment, until the government actually takes possession. Therefore, the Court of Appeals’ order suspending execution constituted a grave abuse of discretion, as it interfered with the enforcement of immutable final judgments.