GR L 18786; (August, 1965) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-18786; August 31, 1965
ROMAN F. DIONISIO, petitioner, vs. SOCORRO FRANCISCO VDA. DE DIONISIO, respondent.
FACTS
Simplicio F. Dionisio owned a parcel of rice land. During his lifetime, he sold an undivided 2/5 portion to his brother, Roman F. Dionisio. Simplicio died intestate in 1944. His surviving heirs were his spouse, Socorro Francisco Vda. de Dionisio, and his brothers, nephews, and nieces. Under the Old Civil Code, the brothers, nephews, and nieces succeeded to Simplicio’s remaining 3/5 portion of the land, while Socorro succeeded to a usufruct over one-half of the estate. Subsequently, on July 17, 1947, the brothers, nephews, and nieces sold their 3/5 portion to Roman F. Dionisio, making him the sole owner of the entire parcel, subject to Socorro’s usufruct. Socorro filed a suit for partition and damages against Roman on June 23, 1953. The trial court ordered partition, awarding Socorro a usufruct over a specific area and damages representing her share of the products. Roman appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found error in the order of partition but concluded it could not be reversed because Roman had not questioned Socorro’s right to demand partition. Roman then appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
1. Whether Socorro, as a usufructuary, has the right to demand physical partition of the property.
2. Whether Roman had questioned Socorro’s right to demand partition.
3. Whether Roman is entitled to reimbursement for expenses on the land under his counterclaim.
RULING
1. No. Under Article 838 of the Old Civil Code, the usufructuary right of the surviving spouse may be satisfied in three alternative ways: by a life annuity, the income from specific property, or payment of money, as determined by agreement or, in default thereof, by judicial decision. The heirs (or in this case, the sole owner subject to the usufruct) have the choice of the form of satisfaction. Payment of the usufructuary’s share in the income suffices to satisfy the right. Therefore, Socorro’s demand for physical partition is denied. Roman is ordered to pay Socorro P270.00 yearly beginning 1947 in satisfaction of her usufruct.
2. Yes. The Supreme Court found that Roman had questioned Socorro’s right to demand partition by praying for the dismissal of her complaint in the Court of First Instance and by assailing the partition decree in his brief before the Court of Appeals.
3. No. The counterclaim for expenses fails as the trial court found no evidence to support the incurrence of such expenses, a finding of fact unreversed by the Court of Appeals.
The appealed judgment was modified accordingly.
