GR L 18765; (July, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-18765; July 31, 1963
ADRIANO D. DASALLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Adriano D. Dasalla, et al., filed a complaint for annulment of a mortgage, its foreclosure, and the resulting certificate of title, plus damages. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the complaint and ordered petitioners to pay substantial sums in moral, actual, compensatory, and corrective damages, as well as attorney’s fees to the defendants. Petitioners timely filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal within the 30-day reglementary period.
Upon hearing for approval of the record on appeal, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was dilatory, prejudicial to their substantial rights, and that pending criminal charges they filed against petitioners might prescribe due to the appeal’s pendency. Petitioners redrafted their record on address objections. Nevertheless, the trial court issued an order dismissing the appeal, adopting the grounds in the defendants’ motion.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal on grounds that it was dilatory and prejudicial.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus and ordered the respondent court to give due course to the appeal. The legal logic is anchored on the clear procedural rules governing the perfection of appeals. Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal is perfected upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal. Once these are filed within the reglementary period, the trial court’s duty is to approve them, provided they conform to the rules, and it loses jurisdiction over the case, except for specific purposes.
The grounds invoked by the trial court for dismissal—that the appeal was “manifestly dilatory,” prejudicial to defendants’ rights, and might cause the prescription of criminal cases—are not among the valid grounds for a trial court to dismiss an appeal. These grounds pertain to the merits or alleged frivolity of the appeal, which are matters exclusively for the appellate court to determine. The trial court’s role is limited to ensuring the technical perfection of the appeal (e.g., timeliness and adequacy of the bond and record). It cannot preemptively adjudicate the appeal’s substantive merit or dilatory character. As held in Velasco v. Rosenberg, motions to dismiss appeals are based on jurisdictional defects or procedural non-compliance, not on matters going to the merits of the cause. The proper remedy against a frivolous appeal lies with the appellate court, which may impose multiple costs. Therefore, the trial court acted improvidently and in excess of its jurisdiction by dismissing the appeal on improper grounds, thereby unlawfully depriving petitioners of their statutory right to appeal.
