G.R. No. L-18748; March 30, 1963
Lucena Valenzuela, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Felicisimo Balayo, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellee Lucena Valenzuela filed an action for forcible entry against defendant-appellant Felicisimo Balayo in the Justice of the Peace Court of Sipocot, Camarines Sur. The inferior court rendered judgment against Balayo, who perfected his appeal to the Court of First Instance. On April 13, 1957, the Deputy Clerk of the Court of First Instance sent notice of the docketing of the appealed case (Civil Case No. 3753) to the parties by registered mail. Appellant Balayo personally received this notice on April 27, 1957.
Despite receiving the notice, Balayo failed to file an answer within the 15-day reglementary period. Consequently, on August 20, 1957, appellee Valenzuela filed a motion to declare him in default. The court granted the motion on August 24, 1957, and after ex parte reception of evidence, rendered judgment against Balayo on October 28, 1957. It was only on December 7, 1957, that Balayo filed an unverified motion to set aside the order of default and the judgment, which motion was not accompanied by any affidavit of merit.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance erred in denying appellant’s motion to annul the order of default and the subsequent judgment, considering his claim that the notice of docketing should have been served upon his attorney of record and not upon him personally.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order, ruling that the service of notice upon appellant himself was proper and that his motion for relief was correctly denied. The legal logic is twofold. First, on procedural grounds, appellant’s motion for relief from the order of default was fatally defective. It was filed almost four months after the default order and over three months after the judgment, and it was not under oath nor supported by an affidavit of merit showing a valid defense, as required by the rules.
Second, and more substantively, the service of the notice of the docketing of the appealed case directly upon the appellant was regular and in accordance with Section 7 of the then Rule 40 (now supplanted by the Rules on Summary Procedure). The Court, citing its precedent in Ortiz vs. Mania, held that on appeal from an inferior court, only the complaint is deemed reproduced, and the proceeding that follows is akin to the initial summoning of the defendant. Since the defendant is already within the court’s jurisdiction by virtue of the appeal, the notice of docketing takes the place of a summons. The rule expressly requires notice to the parties, not to their counsel. The rationale is that the attorneys who perfected the appeal in the justice of the peace court are considered counsel only for that specific purpose, unless a formal entry of appearance is filed in the Court of First Instance. Therefore, appellant’s failure to act upon the valid notice he personally received justified the declaration of default.