G.R. No. L-18674. September 30, 1964.
FLORENTINA CALMA and ENRIQUE ONTANILLAS, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE MONTUYA, FELIX CARIAS, QUIRINA CARIAS, DOMINGO CARIAS and ILUMINADA CARIAS with husband SILVESTRE ANTONIANA, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Plaintiffs Florentina Calma and her husband filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. They alleged that in 1922, defendant Felix Carias, as registered owner of a lot, sold one-half of it through a notarial document to Eulogio Iniego. Iniego and, after his death, his granddaughter Florentina Calma, possessed that portion openly and continuously. Plaintiffs further alleged that on October 31, 1960, defendants, including the original vendor Felix Carias, connived to sell the same one-half portion to defendant Jose Montuya under a “Deed of Adjudication and Sale.” They claimed all defendants acted in bad faith, knowing of the prior 1922 sale.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and prescription. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, finding the motion to dismiss well-taken. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and prescription.

RULING

Yes, the trial court erred. The complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. The test for sufficiency is whether, admitting the alleged facts to be true, a competent court could render a valid judgment. Here, the admitted facts would be: a 1922 sale by the registered owner to plaintiffs’ predecessor; continuous possession since then; and a 1960 sale by the original vendor and others of the same property to Montuya, allegedly in bad faith with knowledge of the prior sale. These allegations clearly constitute a cause of action for declaration of ownership against the defendants.
The unregistered nature of the 1922 sale does not negate a cause of action against parties bound by it. The allegations, deemed admitted in a motion to dismiss, place defendants within that category—either as a party to the unregistered sale or as persons who acted in bad faith with knowledge of it. Consequently, dismissal on the first ground was improper.
Regarding prescription, the trial court incorrectly counted the prescriptive period from 1922. An action accrues only when it can be filed, which requires not just a right but a violation of that right. Under the pleaded facts, the actionable violation occurred on October 31, 1960, when defendants executed the second sale, thereby disturbing plaintiffs’ ownership. The complaint filed on January 17, 1961, was thus well within any applicable prescriptive period. Therefore, the orders of dismissal are set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings.