G.R. No. L-18622; October 30, 1962
Lim Son, petitioner-appellant, vs. The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

On October 12, 1949, a warrant was issued for petitioner Lim Son’s arrest for deportation under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, based on a charge of giving false testimony under oath in an administrative investigation conducted by the Bureau of Immigration. The Board of Commissioners of Immigration, in a decision dated July 14, 1955, found him guilty and ordered his deportation. This decision became final, and a corresponding deportation warrant was issued on August 6, 1955. Petitioner’s motion to re-open the deportation proceedings was denied by the Board on September 3, 1955. Petitioner took no further action until February 29, 1960, when he instituted a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to enjoin his deportation. He assailed the Board’s 1955 decision as null and void, claiming it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the petition. It found petitioner’s cause of action devoid of merit and, significantly, held him guilty of laches for his unreasonable delay in challenging the deportation order. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Manila correctly dismissed petitioner’s action on the ground of laches.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court explained the legal logic for applying laches. Petitioner argued that mere delay does not constitute laches when there is procedural irregularity, specifically claiming that his motion to re-open should have been decided by the Commissioner of Immigration alone, not the Board. The Court rejected this technicality, noting that the Commissioner of Immigration is the Chairman of the Board, making the Board’s action effectively also the Commissioner’s action.
More critically, the Court emphasized the principle of laches, which is the neglect or failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party has abandoned or declined to assert it. The deportation order became final in 1955. Petitioner waited nearly five years, until 1960, to file his judicial challenge without offering any justification for this prolonged inaction. This unreasonable delay prejudiced the administration of justice by allowing a final order to remain dormant. The Court thus found the lower court fully justified in dismissing the petition on the ground of laches.
The Court further noted the absence of any evidence showing grave abuse of discretion by the Board in its factual finding of false testimony. It also denied a belated motion by petitioner’s counsel to reschedule the hearing, citing the manifest lack of merit of the appeal and the need to avoid further delaying the execution of a long-final decision. The appealed decision was affirmed.