G.R. No. L-18615, December 24, 1963
Amando M. Dizon, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Demetrio Encarnacion, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Plaintiff Amando M. Dizon, a resident of Pampanga, filed a civil action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against defendant Demetrio Encarnacion. Dizon sought to recover P50,000 for allegedly libelous statements contained in a pleading titled “Manifestation and Refutation” filed by Encarnacion in Special Proceeding No. 2025 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales. Dizon claimed the statements were derogatory to his dignity and reputation and irrelevant to the issues in that Zambales special proceeding.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of improper venue. He contended that under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1289 , the action should have been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, where the libelous pleading was filed. The trial court in Pampanga granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice, prompting Dizon’s appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Pampanga improperly dismissed the civil action for damages arising from written defamation on the ground of improper venue, pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order and held that venue was properly laid in Pampanga. The Court explained the legal logic of Article 360, as amended, by delineating its general rule and exception. The general rule mandates that civil actions for written defamation “shall” be filed in the province or city where the plaintiff (offended party) or the defendant (accused) resides at the time of the offense. This grants the plaintiff a choice between these two venues.
The exception, introduced by the amendment, states that if the libel is published in a province or city where neither party resides, the action “may” be brought in the court of that place. The Court emphasized that the use of the permissive term “may” indicates this provision is for the benefit of the plaintiff, offering a third optional venue, not a mandatory restriction. It does not abrogate the general rule or force the plaintiff to sue only in the place of publication. This interpretation avoids absurd and unjust results, such as compelling a resident of Jolo to litigate in Batanes simply because a libel was published there, which would hinder the vindication of one’s reputation and could be exploited by defendants to inconvenience plaintiffs. Therefore, Dizon, as a resident of Pampanga, correctly filed his action there. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.