G.R. No. L-18601-2; January 31, 1963
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Lualhati S. Macandog, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The City Fiscal’s office filed two separate informations against appellant Lualhati S. Macandog in the Municipal Court of Manila on November 25, 1960, one for slander and another for slight physical injuries. The accused subsequently filed motions to quash these informations. The motion in the slander case challenged the municipal court’s jurisdiction, arguing that a written complaint from the offended party was an indispensable requirement. For the slight physical injuries charge, the motion asserted that the offense had already prescribed. The Municipal Court denied both motions for lack of merit on February 10, 1961.
Instead of proceeding to trial, Macandog appealed the Municipal Court’s order of denial directly to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. The CFI, however, dismissed her appeal. The CFI ruled that the order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory in nature and, therefore, not subject to an immediate appeal. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law.

ISSUE

The principal legal issue is whether an order issued by an inferior court denying a motion to quash the information is appealable to the Court of First Instance before trial on the merits.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing the appeal. The ruling is grounded on the established principle that an order denying a motion to quash is merely interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate the proceedings nor finally dispose of the parties’ rights; it leaves something more to be done by the trial court. Consequently, such an order is not appealable, as repeatedly held in prior jurisprudence like Collins vs. Wolfe and People vs. Aragon.
The Court explained the proper procedural recourse. Under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, once a motion to quash is overruled, the accused “shall immediately plead,” and the trial must proceed. If a judgment of conviction is eventually rendered, the accused can then appeal from that final judgment and therein raise the very same questions she sought to review via the motion to quash. This prevents undue delay and avoids piecemeal appeals. The Court clarified the appellant’s misinterpretation of Arches vs. Beldia. The phrase “appeal in due time” in that decision refers to an appeal from a final judgment after trial, not from an interlocutory order denying a motion to quash. Therefore, the CFI correctly dismissed the premature appeal. Costs were imposed on the appellant.