G.R. No. L-18552 September 30, 1965
TUASON & LEGARDA, LIMITED, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Tuason & Legarda, Limited, a domestic corporation and owner of the “LA ROSARIO” distillery, had a stock of distilled spirits and compounded liquors stored for many years. On December 16, 1958, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) served an assessment for specific tax and penalty. Petitioner informed the CIR on January 16, 1959, that the stock was oxidized and unfit for consumption, requesting authority to destroy it under government supervision. On February 13 and 16, 1959, CIR officials recommended destruction after finding the stock unfit. However, on April 29, 1959, another CIR official reported the contrary after analysis. Consequently, the CIR denied the destruction request but, in a letter dated July 3, 1959, reduced the original assessment and demanded payment. Petitioner received this amended assessment on August 12, 1959. Petitioner reiterated its destruction request on August 15, 1959, which the CIR denied in a letter dated September 30, 1959, received by petitioner about mid-October 1959. Petitioner again contested the assessment on November 25, 1959. Instead of replying, the CIR served a warrant of distraint and levy on January 20, 1960. On February 11, 1960, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CIR argued the CTA lacked jurisdiction as the petition was filed beyond the 30-day period from receipt of the July 3, 1959, letter. The CTA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time and denied a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for review was filed within the 30-day period prescribed in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the CTA’s decision, holding that the petition for review was filed out of time. The CIR’s letter dated July 3, 1959, which denied petitioner’s request to destroy the stock, reduced the assessment, and demanded payment, constituted the appealable decision. The 30-day period to appeal began to run from August 12, 1959, when petitioner received this letter. Petitioner’s subsequent request on August 15, 1959, was a mere reiteration of previously denied petitions and did not suspend the running of the appeal period. Even if the period were counted from the receipt of the CIR’s denial letter dated September 30, 1959 (assumed to be November 20, 1959, as claimed by petitioner), the petition filed on February 11, 1960, was still beyond the 30-day period. Thus, the assessment had become final, executory, and incontrovertible. The motion for new trial based on accident, mistake, or excusable negligence was correctly denied.