G.R. No. L-18450; May 29, 1964
LU DO and LU YM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR-SEA LABOR UNION (PLASLU) and the PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS UNION (PELU), respondents.

FACTS

The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) initially ordered Lu Do & Lu Ym Corp. to pay its employees a 25% additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and legal holidays. A court examiner computed the total amount due as P8,413.93. The company opposed this computation, asserting that while employees worked only six hours on those days, they were already paid for eight hours of work, thus negating any additional differential. The company presented twenty witnesses who uniformly testified to this six-hour work arrangement and corresponding eight-hour pay.
In 1956, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez sustained the company’s opposition and disapproved the examiner’s report, crediting the “positive, firm and uniform” testimonies of the company’s witnesses over the “contradictory and conflicting” declarations from the union. However, in a 1961 resolution, the CIR en banc, in a decision penned by Judge Martinez himself, reversed the trial court. It ordered the company to pay the P8,413.93, primarily inferring from the company’s admission that an “X” mark on payrolls for 26 guards represented eight hours for overtime purposes, that the same mark must mean eight hours of work for all other employees for holiday differentials.

ISSUE

Whether the CIR en banc committed a reversible error in ordering the payment of additional compensation based on its inference from the payroll markings, thereby disregarding the substantial testimonial evidence presented by the company.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the CIR en banc’s resolution. The Court held that while factual findings of the CIR are generally conclusive, they are not binding if unsupported by substantial evidence. The en banc’s inference that the “X” mark universally meant eight hours for all employees was not a reasonable deduction from the evidence and was insufficient to overcome the direct, affirmative testimonies of the company’s witnesses.
The legal logic centers on the strength of evidence. The company’s admission regarding the guards’ overtime was specific to that context and did not logically extend to the different context of Sunday/holiday pay for over 250 other employees. The positive, categorical, and unanimous testimony of twenty witnesses that they worked six hours but were paid for eight constituted substantial evidence. This affirmative testimony carried greater probative value than the examiner’s negative inference (that he assumed eight hours due to a lack of evidence to the contrary) and the unions’ contradictory evidence. The Court emphasized that affirmative testimony is stronger than negative testimony. Therefore, the CIR en banc’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence, and its resolution was set aside.