G.R. No. L-18439; August 21, 1963
MARIA VDA. DE SOTTO, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, A. S. BUSTOS and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Maria Vda. de Sotto filed a complaint to annul a deed of sale and a subsequent mortgage over her property, alleging fraud by the vendee-spouses Flores. The parties, including the mortgagee Leonor Gutierrez, subsequently entered into a compromise agreement approved by the court. The agreement stipulated that within seven months, the Flores spouses would sell the property to pay Sotto P7,100 or, if unable to sell, would reconvey the property to her subject to the existing mortgage in favor of Gutierrez. The Flores spouses failed to sell the property within the period.
Sotto filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to compel the spouses to execute a deed of reconveyance free from the mortgage. She alternatively prayed for rescission of the compromise agreement under Article 2041 of the Civil Code due to non-compliance. She also alleged that the mortgagee Leonor Gutierrez was a fictitious person, rendering the mortgage void. The respondent judge, Hon. Andres Reyes, denied her motion, ordering reconveyance but expressly subject to the mortgage, citing the terms of the compromise to which Sotto had agreed.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in: (1) ordering the reconveyance of the property subject to the mortgage, and (2) refusing to reopen the case to determine the existence of the mortgagee.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the respondent judge. The legal logic is anchored on the final and executory nature of a judgment based on a compromise agreement. A compromise, once approved by the court, has the force of res judicata and is immediately executory. The parties are bound by its terms, and the court’s role is limited to enforcing it as stipulated.
The Court ruled that the petitioner, having voluntarily consented to a reconveyance “subject to the mortgage,” is estopped from later demanding a reconveyance free of that encumbrance. Her alternative plea for rescission of the compromise under Article 2041 was correctly denied because the provision applies when there has been a breach that would justify rescission in reciprocal obligations. Here, the court found the order for reconveyance subject to the mortgage to be a valid enforcement of the agreement’s specific terms, not a breach warranting rescission.
Furthermore, the Court held that the question regarding the mortgagee’s existence cannot be litigated in these proceedings to enforce the compromise. To permit such an inquiry would be to alter the terms of the final judgment and re-litigate matters already settled. The respondent judge’s refusal to reopen the case for this purpose was a proper exercise of judicial discretion, not an abuse thereof. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted only for jurisdictional errors, not for correcting alleged errors of judgment.