G.R. No. L-18405; September 30, 1963
URBANO DE VENECIA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. AQUILINO DEL ROSARIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS

The parties entered into a compromise agreement in a collection suit, which was approved by the Court of First Instance as a judgment. The defendants admitted a debt of P6,475.26 and agreed to a payment schedule. To secure the obligation, they ceded three specific parcels of land by way of security. A clause stipulated that upon default, the balance would become immediately due and payable, and the plaintiffs could secure immediate execution, with the defendants waiving “whatever right a mortgagor may have short of foreclosure proceedings.” After paying the initial installments, the defendants defaulted. The plaintiffs moved for execution, which the trial court granted. The issued alias writ of execution commanded the sheriff to satisfy the judgment from the three described parcels and, should they be insufficient, “of the other goods and chattels of the said defendants.”
The defendants moved to quash the writ, arguing that the portion authorizing levy on other properties varied the judgment. They contended that, per the agreement, execution must be confined first and exclusively to the three secured parcels, and only if these prove insufficient after being sold could other properties be reached. The trial court denied their motion, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of execution, by authorizing the sheriff to levy on properties other than the three specifically mortgaged parcels if they are insufficient, conforms to the compromise judgment.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order, ruling that the writ of execution substantially conformed to the judgment. The Court rejected the defendants’ interpretation that execution was strictly limited to the three parcels. While the compromise agreement designated specific real properties as security, the judgment itself did not expressly state that these properties were the exclusive source for satisfaction. The critical waiver clause, wherein defendants waived “whatever right a mortgagor may have short of foreclosure proceedings,” indicated an intent to expedite collection, not to restrict the plaintiffs to a foreclosure remedy. This waiver facilitated a direct execution process akin to an ordinary money judgment.
The Court distinguished the general procedure under Section 34, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which requires a return of an unsatisfied execution before examining a debtor for other assets, as applicable to situations of concealed property. Here, there was no allegation of concealment. The logical and proper procedure, as reflected in the writ, was to execute first against the specifically mortgaged properties. Only if the proceeds from those properties were insufficient to satisfy the judgment debt could the sheriff then levy on the defendants’ other assets. The writ correctly embodied this sequence. Therefore, it did not alter the judgment but properly enforced it. The order denying the motion to quash was affirmed.