G.R. No. L-18351 March 26, 1965
CHOY KING TEE alias CHUA KING TEE, petitioner-appellee, vs. EMILIO L. GALANG, as Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

Petitioner-appellee Choy King Tee, a Chinese citizen residing in Hongkong, is the wife of Tan Ban Seng, a Chinese native who was granted Philippine citizenship by naturalization on January 13, 1959. Appellee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and had made several trips to and from Hongkong, with her last return in January 1960, when she was admitted as a temporary visitor. Her authorized stay expired on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband filed a petition with the Commissioner of Immigration seeking recognition of his wife and son as Philippine citizens, cancellation of their alien certificates of registration, and issuance of identification certificates. The petition was granted for the husband and son but denied for the appellee. Appellee then filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which ruled in her favor, declaring her a Philippine citizen automatically upon her husband’s naturalization and ordering the Commissioner to cancel her alien certificate and issue an identification certificate.

ISSUE

Whether an alien woman automatically acquires Philippine citizenship upon marriage to a Filipino citizen, or whether she must first prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization under the Naturalization Law.

RULING

The Supreme Court REVERSED the decision of the lower court. An alien wife does not automatically acquire Philippine citizenship upon her husband’s naturalization. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law ( Commonwealth Act No. 473 ), which provides that “any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines,” the alien wife must prove that she has all the qualifications prescribed in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the said law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen. The Court upheld its uniform rulings in previous cases, emphasizing that the requirement that the woman “might herself be lawfully naturalized” refers to these qualifications and disqualifications, and is not mere surplusage. This interpretation aligns with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. Since appellee failed to prove she possessed all the qualifications for naturalization, she was not entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen. The petition for prohibition and mandamus was denied.