G.R. No. L-18258; April 27, 1963
GUILLERMO COMEDA, petitioner-appellant, vs. E. O. CAJILOG, etc., et al., respondents-appellees.

FACTS

On April 15, 1958, Cornelio O. Tan filed a money claim against Guillermo Comeda before the Justice of the Peace Court of Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. Summons required Comeda to appear on April 28, 1958. On that date, Comeda appeared and requested time to file an answer; the court granted the request and reset the hearing for May 5, 1958. On May 5, Comeda failed to appear at the scheduled time. Consequently, the court declared him in default, received Tan’s evidence ex parte, and proceeded to render judgment on the merits.
Approximately one hour and fifteen minutes after the declaration of default, Comeda appeared in court. He immediately presented his written answer and moved for a new trial. The court merely noted that his request would be considered. On May 12, 1958, Comeda received a copy of the adverse decision. He filed a formal motion for new trial, which was promptly denied, as was his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Comeda then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Misamis Occidental, seeking to annul the default order and the decision. Respondent Tan moved to dismiss the petition, arguing certiorari was improper and appeal was the correct remedy. The CFI agreed and dismissed the petition, prompting Comeda’s appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari, thereby upholding the justice of the peace court’s declaration of default and subsequent judgment.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s order of dismissal. The Court held that the justice of the peace court committed a grave abuse of discretion in declaring Comeda in default and in denying him a hearing. The legal logic is twofold. First, under the applicable rules for inferior courts, default is predicated on a party’s failure to appear, not merely a failure to file an answer. Comeda had already made a general appearance by requesting a postponement on the initial hearing date, which constituted a submission to the court’s jurisdiction. Second, and more critically, the court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the default when Comeda appeared barely over an hour late and promptly moved for a new trial, especially since the decision on the merits had not yet been rendered at the moment of his appearance and plea. The Court, citing Section 14, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court and its precedent in Carballo v. Encarnacion, emphasized that principles of fairness and substantial justice demanded that Comeda be given an opportunity to present his defense under these circumstances. Since a default judgment from an inferior court is not appealable, the proper remedy to challenge such a patently abusive and irregular proceeding was indeed certiorari. The CFI therefore erred in dismissing the petition. The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order and remanded the case to the CFI for further proceedings on the certiorari petition.