G.R. No. L-18150 July 30, 1965
SUPERIOR BALDOZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SERAPIA PAPA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

On January 7, 1957, spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina Agaceta (parents of appellees) applied for registration of a parcel of land under Act No. 496 . After publication and hearing, an order of general default was entered on May 16, 1957. On the same date, Baldomero Baldoz (father of appellant) filed a petition to lift the default order against him and to admit his opposition, which the court granted. The case was reset for hearing on October 1, 1958. Before this date, Baldomero Baldoz died. His son, appellant Superior Baldoz, did not inform the court of his father’s death, so the hearing notice was returned unserved. On September 11, 1958, appellees were allowed to substitute the original applicants, having purchased the land. At the October 1, 1958 hearing, appellees appeared, but no oppositor appeared. The court allowed appellees to present evidence and declared oppositor Baldomero Baldoz in default for nonappearance. On October 10, 1958, Baldomero Baldoz’s counsel filed a motion to set aside the default order, alleging Baldomero’s death on July 28, 1957, and praying that appellant be substituted as party-oppositor. This motion was denied on October 31, 1959, and appellant did not appeal the denial. On February 16, 1959, the court rendered judgment decreeing registration in favor of appellees. After the judgment became executory, the court issued an order for issuance of the decree on May 4, 1959. The Land Registration Commission issued Decree No. N-1779 on June 16, 1959, and the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 15264 in appellees’ names. On June 17, 1959, appellees filed motions for writs of demolition and possession. Appellant filed an opposition and counter-petition, which was denied on February 9, 1960. Three weeks later, appellant commenced the present action to annul the decision in the registration case, alleging that the court committed reversible error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his admitted written opposition and that the denial of appellant’s motion for substitution deprived him of his day in court. Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state a cause of action, and res judicata or statute of limitations. On September 30, 1960, the court dismissed the complaint, holding that the final judgment in the registration case was res judicata and that the action, being a petition for review of a decree, was filed beyond the one-year period and not based on fraud as required by Section 38 of Act No. 496 . Appellant appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the lower court in the registration case lost jurisdiction over the person of Baldomero Baldoz due to his death.
2. Whether the judgment in the registration proceedings is res judicata.
3. Whether the present action for annulment of the registration decree is proper.

RULING

1. On jurisdiction over Baldomero Baldoz: The Court found appellant’s contention without merit. By filing a motion for substitution and seeking affirmative relief, appellant and his co-heirs submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The order denying their motion was final and conclusive, and their failure to appeal from it rendered the order and the registration proceedings final and conclusive against them.
2. On res judicata: The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the judgment in the registration proceedings is res judicata. Registration proceedings are in rem, binding upon the whole world, and a final decree of registration issued in accordance with law is reviewable only within one year and upon the ground of fraud. The complaint did not allege fraud justifying reopening of the decree.
3. On propriety of the action: The Court held that any petition to set aside the decree and reopen the registration proceedings must be filed within one year from the issuance of the decree, not as a separate action but as a motion in the same registration proceeding. The present action, filed as a separate complaint, was improper and time-barred.
The decision appealed from was affirmed, with costs against appellant.