G.R. No. L-18137. August 31, 1963. ROSELLER T. LIM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PACITA DE LOS SANTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS
The defendants-appellees contracted to sell subdivision lots to the plaintiffs-appellants through identical written contracts executed in early 1960. These contracts provided for installment payments but were silent regarding the construction of roads or compliance with Quezon City Ordinance No. 2969 and National Planning Commission regulations. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that, prior to and during the contract executions, the defendant Pacita de los Santos verbally represented and promised that she would construct adequate road outlets to a public highway, essential for making the lots habitable and valuable. Relying on these representations, the plaintiffs paid installments, some paid in full, and began constructing residences on the lots. When the defendants failed to construct the roads despite demands, the plaintiffs filed an action for specific performance and damages.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and lack of legal capacity to sue. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that the written contracts contained no such obligation to build roads. Upon the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, the court, over objection, conducted a hearing limited to receiving evidence on the alleged verbal promise. Finding the promise was verbal, not included in the written agreements, and denied by the defendants, the court denied the reconsideration. The plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUE
1. Did the complaint state a cause of action to compel the defendant to construct roads?
2. Do the plaintiffs have the legal capacity to sue to enforce the city ordinance and planning regulations?
RULING
Yes, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint based solely on the absence of the road-building stipulation in the written contracts, thereby ignoring the specific allegations in paragraph VI of the complaint. That paragraph expressly averred that the defendant made representations, upon which the plaintiffs relied to their detriment by paying and building houses, that she would construct adequate road outlets. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the material facts alleged in the complaint. If these allegations are true, they establish a cause of action for the enforcement of the defendant’s representations under the principle of promissory estoppel, as the plaintiffs altered their position based on those promises.
The defendant’s argument that the parol evidence rule bars proof of the oral promise is a matter of evidence going to the merits, not a proper ground for testing the legal sufficiency of the pleadings at the dismissal stage. Furthermore, the trial court’s procedure of holding a hearing to receive evidence on the motion for reconsideration was irregular. In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, the court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations or receive evidence; it must confine itself to the facts pleaded in the complaint.
On the second issue, the plaintiffs have the legal capacity to sue. The lower court incorrectly applied the doctrine from Subido vs. City of Manila, which held that a private citizen cannot generally contest an ordinance’s validity without showing special injury. Here, the plaintiffs are not contesting the ordinance’s validity but seeking to compel a private party to comply with regulations from which they suffer a special, particular injury as lot purchasers deprived of essential access. Moreover, their primary cause of action arises from the defendant’s own alleged promises, which is distinct from and sufficient irrespective of the public regulations. The order of dismissal is set aside, and the case is remanded for trial on the merits.