G.R. No. L-18055; August 31, 1962
FELIX MORADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge, Court of First Instance, Quezon City and J. M. TUASON CO., INC., respondents.

FACTS

J. M. Tuason Co., Inc. filed an action for recovery of possession against Felix Morada, alleging it was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Quezon City and that Morada had unlawfully taken possession of a portion thereof. In his answer, Morada claimed ownership, asserting his wife had acquired the land from Roman Mendoza in 1946 and that the property was part of a tract authorized for government expropriation.
Subsequently, Morada filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against Roman Mendoza, the alleged vendor, to enforce the warranty against eviction. The respondent judge denied the motion. The court initially reasoned that since Morada’s wife, not Morada himself, was the purported buyer from Mendoza, she alone had the right to enforce the warranty. In a later order clarifying the denial, the court additionally cited Article 1559 of the New Civil Code, stating the period for filing such a third-party complaint had expired, as it must be filed within the time for answering the original complaint.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in denying Morada’s motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against Roman Mendoza.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus, upholding the respondent judge’s denial. The legal logic rests on three key points. First, the Court found no privity of contract between Morada and the proposed third-party defendant, Roman Mendoza. The petitioner’s own answer alleged that his wife purchased the property. Therefore, the right to sue Mendoza for breach of warranty against eviction belonged to the wife, not to Morada. Consequently, Morada had no clear legal right to file the third-party complaint, which is a prerequisite for the extraordinary writ of mandamus.
Second, the allowance of a third-party complaint is discretionary upon the court under Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to control or correct a judge’s exercise of discretion, absent a showing of grave abuse equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The respondent judge’s decision, based on the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties Morada sought to implead, was a valid exercise of that discretion.
Finally, the Court suggested the proper procedural recourse was for Morada’s wife to intervene in the main action. As an intervenor, she could then potentially file a third-party complaint against her vendor. Given these conclusions, the Court deemed it unnecessary to resolve the ancillary issue regarding the applicable period under Article 1559 of the Civil Code for filing a third-party complaint based on warranty against eviction. The preliminary injunction was dissolved.