G.R. No. L-17777; June 29, 1962
MODESTA N. OCA and AMADO OCA, petitioners-appellants, vs. JUDGE DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, Judge of the Municipal Court of Quezon City and OSCAR A. INOCENTES, Special Counsel for Quezon City, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioners Modesta N. Oca and Amado Oca were charged in the Municipal Court of Quezon City with the crime of “Ill Treatment” under an information alleging that they conspired to strangle and push one Maria Loreto Lintag de Garcia onto a cement floor, inflicting physical injuries not requiring medical attendance. After arraignment and entering a plea of not guilty, the petitioners filed a motion to quash the information, contending it charged two distinct offenses: ill-treatment and physical injuries. The municipal court denied this motion.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and/or certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, seeking to enjoin the trial and quash the information. Without requiring an answer from the respondents or setting the petition for hearing, the CFI dismissed it, ruling that despite the discrepancy in the offense’s designation, the information in fact charged only one offense—slight physical injuries. The petitioners appealed this order of dismissal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the petition for prohibition/certiorari, thereby upholding the validity of the information filed in the municipal court.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, sustaining the validity of the information for two principal reasons. First, the petitioners waived any objection to the form of the information by failing to move for its quashal before entering their plea. Under Rule 113, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, such a waiver occurs, except only when the information charges no offense at all or the court lacks jurisdiction, which exceptions were not applicable here.
Second, on the merits, the information validly charges a single offense. The Court reiterated the settled doctrine that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not by the technical designation given by the prosecuting attorney in the caption but by the actual facts recited in the body of the information. Here, while the caption denominated the crime as “Ill Treatment” under Article 266(3) of the Revised Penal Code, the factual allegations in the body—specifically, the act of inflicting physical injuries which did not require medical attendance—constitute the offense of slight physical injuries under Article 266(2) of the same Code. The accused’s substantial rights are protected as long as the facts constituting the offense are alleged with clarity, enabling them to prepare an adequate defense. The law, not the fiscal’s characterization, defines the crime based on those alleged acts. Therefore, the petitioners must stand trial based on the facts alleged, and the lower court correctly refused to quash the information. The order was affirmed, with costs against the appellants.