G.R. No. L-17745; October 31, 1963
ANTONIO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. FELIX BALALLO, respondent.

FACTS

On December 28, 1959, outgoing Mayor Jose Burgonio appointed Antonio Villanueva as Chief of Police of Santa, Ilocos Sur, following the resignation of the former incumbent. Villanueva was a civil service eligible. The provincial treasurer, acting as deputy of the Commissioner of Civil Service under Republic Act No. 2260 , approved the appointment on the same date. Villanueva took his oath of office on December 30, 1959, and began performing the duties and receiving the salary for the position.
On January 5, 1960, the newly elected Mayor, Jesus Bueno, appointed Felix Balallo to the same position. The Commissioner of Civil Service subsequently approved Balallo’s appointment and, in an indorsement dated May 13, 1960, revoked the earlier attestation to Villanueva’s appointment. Mayor Bueno consequently ordered Villanueva to cease serving. Villanueva filed a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Balallo’s right to the office.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the Commissioner of Civil Service had the authority to revoke a completed and valid appointment, which had already been attested to by his deputy, simply because a subsequent appointment for the same position was issued by a new mayor.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and ruled in favor of Villanueva. The legal logic centers on the nature of a completed appointment and the limited, verificatory role of the Civil Service Commission.
An appointment to a civil service position becomes complete upon the performance of the last act required by law from the appointing power. Here, Mayor Burgonio, the competent appointing authority at the time, performed all acts necessary to complete the appointment: he extended the appointment to an eligible candidate, and it was attested to by the provincial treasurer as the Commissioner’s deputy. Villanueva’s acceptance through his oath of office finalized the process. The subsequent attestation by the Commissioner of Civil Service is not an approving or discretionary act that forms part of the appointment itself. It is merely a mandatory check to ensure the appointee possesses the required qualifications and that the appointment complies with civil service law. Once the appointee is found qualified—as Villanueva undisputedly was—the Commissioner has no discretion to withhold attestation.
The Court distinguished the cited precedents. In Gorospe, the Commissioner properly refused attestation because the appointee had a prior dismissal for cause, a specific disqualification under Civil Service Rules. In Cui, the appointment itself was incomplete for lack of a required presidential approval. No such disqualifications or legal defects existed in Villanueva’s case. Therefore, the Commissioner’s subsequent “revocation” based solely on the new mayor’s conflicting appointment was an invalid encroachment on the appointing power of the previous mayor. The appointment of Villanueva was valid and complete, granting him a legal right to the office, which could not be defeated by a subsequent appointment to an already filled position.