GR L 17616; (May, 1962) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-17616; May 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FELIPE ABUY, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On April 1, 1959, Felipe Abuy was charged in the Municipal Court of Zamboanga City with Trespass to Dwelling (Crim. Case No. 6751) for allegedly entering the dwelling of Ruperto Carpio on February 21, 1959. During trial, the prosecution moved for dismissal on November 5, 1959, conceding its evidence could not sustain a conviction. The court granted the motion, resulting in Abuy’s acquittal. Subsequently, on November 13, 1959, a new information was filed against Abuy for Unjust Vexation (Crim. Case No. 7201), alleging that on the same date, February 21, 1959, he embraced and held the wrist of Nicolasa B. de Magadia, causing her vexation inside her dwelling.
ISSUE
Whether the crime of Unjust Vexation had already prescribed at the time the second information was filed on November 13, 1959.
RULING
Yes, the crime had prescribed. Unjust Vexation is a light offense under Article 287(2) of the Revised Penal Code, with a two-month prescriptive period per Article 90(6). The prescriptive period commenced on February 21, 1959, the date the crime was discovered. The filing of the second information on November 13, 1959, occurred over eight months later, well beyond the two-month limit. The prosecution argued that the earlier filing of the Trespass to Dwelling charge on April 1, 1959, interrupted the prescription period for Unjust Vexation. The Court rejected this, holding that under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the filing of a complaint or information interrupts prescription only for the specific offense charged in that proceeding. The two informations charged distinct offenses with different elements and different offended parties (Ruperto Carpio vs. Nicolasa B. de Magadia). They were unrelated except for the same accused and date. Therefore, the proceedings for Trespass to Dwelling did not toll the prescription period for Unjust Vexation. The Municipal Court correctly granted the motion to quash, and the Court of First Instance properly denied the prosecution’s appeal. The order of dismissal was affirmed.