G.R. No. L-17560; October 31, 1962
VICENTE GARCIA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE FENOY, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Plaintiffs, heirs of Juan Garcia, were involved in Civil Case No. 13847 against Pedro de Guzman, seeking to cancel his title over a parcel of land, alleging fraudulent acquisition. A notice of lis pendens was annotated on De Guzman’s title. Separately, in Civil Case No. 8425, De Guzman obtained a judgment for compensation from the government for a portion of that land expropriated for the Agno River Control Project. Defendant Jose Fenoy, as De Guzman’s counsel, sought to facilitate payment by having the lis pendens partially cancelled to exclude the expropriated portion. To induce plaintiff Raymundo Meris-Morales (counsel for the Garcias) to sign a necessary communication to the Register of Deeds, Fenoy executed a written promise to give Meris-Morales and his clients one-fourth of the compensation money. The plaintiffs consented and signed. After the lis pendens was partially cancelled, De Guzman collected the funds. Fenoy later refused to pay the promised share, stating his client’s disapproval pending the final outcome of Case No. 13847. The plaintiffs sued Fenoy for specific performance and damages, alleging personal liability due to deceit.

ISSUE

Whether the plaintiffs have a valid cause of action against defendant Fenoy for damages arising from the alleged promise and the partial cancellation of the lis pendens.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, ruling that the plaintiffs had no cause of action. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve issues regarding Fenoy’s authority to bind his client or potential estoppel. The legal logic centered on the indispensable element of damage. The Court took judicial notice of its prior decision in G.R. No. L-15988 (promulgated August 30, 1962), which involved the same plaintiffs and the underlying property dispute. In that decision, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the Garcias’ claim in Civil Case No. 13847, holding their action was barred by a prior land registration decree from 1923 and the statute of limitations. Consequently, the Court conclusively established that the plaintiffs had no legal right or interest in the subject land. Since they possessed no right to the property, the partial cancellation of the lis pendens—regardless of the circumstances or Fenoy’s promise—could not have caused them any legal damage. A cause of action requires a legal right of the plaintiff violated by the defendant. With no underlying right to the land or its proceeds, the plaintiffs failed to establish an essential element of their claim. Therefore, the complaint correctly stated no cause of action. The order of dismissal was affirmed.